Saturday 1 February 2020
Saturday 4 January 2020
INTRODUCTION
MODERNITY AND RATIONALE
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The following is a collection of texts that present a range of rationales that have been crystallized in the time leading up to and including the modern.
These are a number of general parameters, references, theories, norms, values, perspectives, beliefs, orientations, explanations, logics, typologies, paradigms, discourses, morals, conclusions, starting points, definitions, categorizations, approaches, equations, rationalizations, rationales, meanings, causal relations, cultures, systems, patterns, developments, worldviews, arrangements, understandings, expressions, communications, realities, diagnoses, scales, or hypotheses.
As such, it is an introduction to a segment of human experiences through time.
While some texts have an explicit connection to religion and God, other texts are explicitly based on human experience independent of this connection.
Social science
The texts should form the basis for reflection and discussion about the rationales, their presentation in the texts and other approaches to these parameters.
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The following is a collection of texts that present a range of rationales that have been crystallized in the time leading up to and including the modern.
These are a number of general parameters, references, theories, norms, values, perspectives, beliefs, orientations, explanations, logics, typologies, paradigms, discourses, morals, conclusions, starting points, definitions, categorizations, approaches, equations, rationalizations, rationales, meanings, causal relations, cultures, systems, patterns, developments, worldviews, arrangements, understandings, expressions, communications, realities, diagnoses, scales, or hypotheses.
As such, it is an introduction to a segment of human experiences through time.
While some texts have an explicit connection to religion and God, other texts are explicitly based on human experience independent of this connection.
Social science
The texts should form the basis for reflection and discussion about the rationales, their presentation in the texts and other approaches to these parameters.
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION - 1981
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
Jürgen Habermas
Presentation translated by Poyan Taherloo 2019
PDF VERSION
Jürgen Habermas
Presentation translated by Poyan Taherloo 2019
PDF VERSION
Tuesday 17 December 2019
CHAPTER VII THOMAS AQUINAS - 1983
CHAPTER VII: Thomas Aquinas
'Tenkningens historie 1'
Kapitel VII: Thomas Aquinas
Anfinn Stigen
Gyldendal Norsk Forlag
1983
ORIGINAL TEXT SCAN
Translated by Poyan Taherloo 2019
PDF VERSION
'Tenkningens historie 1'
Kapitel VII: Thomas Aquinas
Anfinn Stigen
Gyldendal Norsk Forlag
1983
ORIGINAL TEXT SCAN
Translated by Poyan Taherloo 2019
PDF VERSION
Sunday 7 July 2019
THE LIBERAL PEACE THESIS - 2005
The Liberal Peace Thesis
By Poyan Taherloo - November 2005
The liberal tradition in International politics originates from the time around the emergence of the modern liberal states. Liberal philosophers as Locke, Bentham and Kant, saw a great potential for human progress, in civil society and capitalist economy, which could be achieved if the state could ensure the liberty of the individual. The liberal tradition is thus based on the basic assumption regarding an optimistic view of humanity, a linear conception of history and a perception of the state that should be guarantor of the liberty of the individual.
The liberal theory is based on an optimistic view of humanity, where the rational ‘self-interest maximizing’ human is perceived, as being capable of realizing the many common interests, between humans, and the great benefits that can be achieved by cooperation, both nationally and internationally.
Against the backdrop of an optimistic view of humanity, the liberal theory is based on a linear conception of history, where humans are capable of learning from the mistakes of the past, and where the historically accumulated knowledge, constitutes the foundation for lasting progress towards prosperity and cooperation.
In order to succeed in achieving these human progresses, it is necessary that the state upholds law and order, and ensures the liberty and property of the individual.
Based on these assumptions, liberalists argue for, that the human progress, particularly in relation to the modernization processes, will result in increased international cooperation and peace (Jackson and Sorensen 2003:106-108).
Liberal peace
The thesis about ‘liberal peace’ is in many ways very pivotal in the liberal tradition, and derive originally from Immanuel Kant, who in his book ‘Perpetual Peace’, from 1795 set up some preconditions for international peace. It can be derived from Kants original text that international peace depends on the proliferation of democratic governance, economic interdependence together with international law and international organizations (Oneal and Russett 2003:267).
There are hereof three hypotheses, that are each emphasized particularly as part of different schools of liberal theory, but the proliferation of democratic governance is particularly important, why the thesis is also defined as ‘democratic peace’. This is because the individual liberty, as in democratic states, is just the precondition for utilizing the human potential. The first hypotheses is that democracies are more reluctant to use force, particularly against other democracies, than non-democracies, which is pivotal, in Republican liberalism. The second hypotheses is, that economic interdependence constitutes an important incentive for, maintaining peaceful relations between democracies, which is pivotal in Interdependence liberalism. Finally there is a hypotheses about that international organizations influence democracies to avoid war, which is pivotal in Institutional liberalism (Oneal and Russett 2003: 273; Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 112 ff.).
In the thesis regarding liberal peace the three factors, that have significance for peace, are not isolated from each other, but reinforce each other mutually. International relations can for an example develop into peaceful interaction, through mutually beneficial economic trade, ensured by international law, and controlled by - and negotiated in international organizations (Oneal and Russett 2003: 281).
Theoretical argumentation
There are two overall explanations for that democracies are less inclined to wage war against each other. The one explanation is that democratic countries, usually resolve national conflict peacefully through dialog and negotiation, without resorting to threats and violence, and because democracies are aware that other democracies have same norms, they would apply this practice in relation to each other. This is due to not least a respect for the common democratic norms and values, why it will be normal with negotiation and compromise, and unacceptable to use threats and force.
The other reason is that democratic leaders are held accountable for their decisions, that are continuously evaluated in open democratic institutions. Because the expense of war is high, and in the end can cost democratic leaders their power, they are less inclined to wage war. Authoritarian leaders in contrast are not held accountable in the same way, as they can stay in power, by oppressing their populations (Oneal and Russet 2003: 274).
There are accordingly two overall explanations for that increased economic interdependence between democracies reduce the probability for war, between these. The one explanation is that increased trade between states, at the same time result in an increased communication between these, that also reaches beyond a specifically trades related communication, which form a basis for mutual understanding, recognition and cooperation.
The other explanation is that peace between states is crucial for inter-state trade, why increased trade between states means, that there will be greater political opposition to initiating a war, and thereby loosing the economic gain in mutual trade (Oneal and Russet 2003: 275).
There are many explanations to that international organizations effect the behavior of states, so that they are less inclined to wage war. Some of the overall are that international organizations reduce insecurity by providing the member states with information and forums for cooperation and dialog, function as mediator in conflicts between states, influence state norms, clarify common interests and constitute common reference for the states (Oneal and Russett 2003: 276).
Empirical argumentation
One of the studies that confirm the thesis regarding liberal peace, is a statistical analysis of the behavior of states in regard to each other in the period 1885-1992. In this study all states have been set up across each other in pairs, which has given more than 230.000 cases, where a case is the relations between two states in a certain year. Furthermore every state, each year in this period has been placed on a scale over how democratic this state is assessed to be, how much economic interdependence there has been between the state in question and each of the other states, together with how many international organizations the concerned state is member of, that the other state is also member of.
In assessment of the degree of democracy the study has looked at, the presence of institutions and procedures, through which the citizens have the opportunity to express their preferences about alternative politicians and leaders, institutionalized limits on the use of force by the state, together with guaranties for the liberty of the citizens in their everyday and in political participation (Oneal and Russett 2003: 272).
In assessment of the degree of interdependence the study has for each case put together the one country’s’ import and export in relation to the other country, and divided this number with the BNP of the country. In this way the study has reached a number for how much of a certain country’s BNP that consists in trade with the other country in a given case, and thereby the degree of interdependence (Oneal and Russet 2003: 275).
Finally the study has assessed the degree of membership of international organizations, on how many international organizations, which both states in a certain case are members of (Oneal and Russet 2003: 276).
On these grounds the study has calculated the probability of military conflict in a certain case, with a certain place in regard to the three variables, democracy, interdependence and membership of international organizations, and held this probability up against another case, with a different place in regard to these variables. In this way it has been possible to derive the three variable’s influence on the probability of a military conflict between states (Oneal and Russet 2003: 271).
It is important to underline, that the study can identify and demonstrate a connection between variation in the three variables and the probability of conflict between states, but that it is for the theory to explain the specific causal relation (Oneal and Russet 2003: 277).
The result of the statistical analysis shows a clear connection between the three variables and the probability of conflict. This connection is demonstrated by keeping two of the three variables constant, while comparing a case where the last variable is at 90th percentile, with a case where the same variable is at 10th percentile.
The analysis shows that if the least democratic state in a case is located at 90th percentile (near the most democratic end), instead of an authoritarian 10th percentile, the probability of military conflict, is 86 % less. The analysis shows that military conflict between very democratic states are very rare, while conflicts between authoritarian states are much more probable.
Conflicts are furthermore probable in cases with a very democratic state and a very authoritarian state.
The effect of economic interdependence on the probability of military conflict, is not so evident, as with democracy, but the connection can be demonstrated. If the least interdependent of the states in a case is at 90th percentile, the probability of military conflict is reduced with approximately one third, compared to if it was at 10th percentile.
The effect of common membership of an international organization in a certain case, on the probability of conflict, is also very clear. An increase in common membership of international organizations to 90th percentile, reduces the probability of conflict with approximately 40 %.
If all three variables are assessed together, that is the degree of democracy, economic interdependence and common membership of international organizations, are increased to 90th percentile, for the lowest located state in a case, it reduces the probability of military conflict by 95 % (Oneal and Russet 2003: 278).
The reasons of realism against liberal peace theory
Much of the critique of the liberal tradition, originates from the realism tradition. Based on a ‘pessimistic’ view of humanity, realism build on a cyclical perception of history, where ‘history is the same damn thing over again’. The first priority of the states is still to survive, interaction still happens within a state system where anarchy rules, and self-help is still crucial, as no other looks out for the state in such a system, besides the state itself. The states therefor rearm in an attempt to be able to defend themselves, which is perceived as a threat by other states, which also rearm. A situation that in the end results in war between states (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 125).
The common thread in the realism critique of liberal theory, and the thesis of liberal peace, is that there despite great changes in the interaction patterns of states, which realism recognizes, still exists a state system of anarchy, that will continue to exist, and that implies insecurity for the states (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 127).
The argumentation of the realism against republican liberalism is that peace between democracies always can change to war between these, and that ‘today’s friends very well can end up being enemies tomorrow’. Besides there are no guaranties that states will continue to be democracies, and that they will not change into authoritarian states or other forms of non-democracies (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 126).
This argumentation seems as an attempt to underline, that realism still can have greater influence again. Because it is clear, that there is a probability that democracies can wage war against each other, which the thesis of liberal peace does not exclude, and that democracies can get to be non-democracies. But with the proliferation of democracy, and an extensive cooperation between democracies, this probability is severely reduced. There are also examples of democracies, where it would be unimaginable with a return to an authoritarian system, partly because democracy is deeply institutionalized and enjoy very great support among the population, and partly because it would endanger the state’s good relations with other democracies. It is thus unimaginable, that for an example an EU-country would go back to an authoritarian system, and therefor the historic development in these countries are irreversible, on these areas. In the same way the probability of war between these states is extremely small, simply because the cost would be vital, not least because of the very extensive cooperation.
The realism argumentation against Interdependence liberalism is that economic interdependence is not something new, and that this interdependence has not previously been able to prevent war. The share of export of the world’s PNP was less in 1970 than in the years from 1880-1910. The great increase in world trade in the period 1950-1970, which liberalists perceive as sign of greater interdependence, is nothing more than an increase from an unusually low level, due to the two world wars and The great depression, in the first half of the 20th century (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 125).
It is very possible that economic interdependence is not a new phenomenon, but the social - and technological development, not least in the last half of the 20th century, have great significance for how economic interdependence effects the probability of war. Today there is a greater awareness amongst the population regarding the economic interdependence, and which effect it has for the prosperity. Therefor it must be expected that political decisions, that jeopardize inter-state trade, are assessed by the population on different grounds than before.
Furthermore there are many democratic countries, particularly in western Europe, where the population today enjoy a level of prosperity, that has not been the case previously, and which the population is unwilling to jeopardize. What one does not have, one cannot lose, but what one has got use to is difficult to do without, and if this can be avoided, it would be best.
So it may be right that the economic interdependence is not something new, but the development in the political-, social-, and technological areas gives this interdependence an entirely different significance that previously.
The realism also argues against the significance that Liberal institutionalism attribute international organizations. Despite that states cooperate in international organizations, these organizations by themselves do not have any significance. International organizations merely constitute a power based interaction between states, where the strongest wins. Without a supranational power monopoly, the international organizations do not change the fact, that the state system is an anarchy, and that states are self-sustained (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 129).
The question is how much order there nevertheless is in the anarchy, and how much international organizations can influence self-sustained states, without the presence of a supranational power monopoly. Within the social sciences today there are a great approval of that ‘institutions matter’, and that institutions effect the rationales and preferences of the members.
There are many examples of collectively determined common norms, values and strategies, that set limitations on the state’s possibilities, independent of their power position, not least in regard to the EU and WTO. It can not be contradicted that the power position of the states, also have a very great significance within international organizations. But the single state’s power position through international organizations, face the accumulated power that states have together in a common cause, why there comes about a form of order in the system, that despite the absence of a supranational power monopoly, can resemble the national democratic system.
Finally there exist a realist argumentation against the causal logic, that the thesis of liberal peace is based on, namely that democratic governance reduces the probability of war, and thereby effects the international system. Realists argue that the opposite is the case, so that the conditions of the international system’s structure, that determine the external conditions of the states, also have crucial influence on the configuration of the national systems of the states. It is argued that the greater an external threat the state encounters, or finds as encountering, the greater extent the foreign policy of the state will be determined on ‘authoritarian’ grounds, and the more centralized the structure of the political system will be (Layne1994: 45).
But the explanation of the realism is not possible to falsify, because explanations for a state becoming less democratic, always can be found. If there are no evidence of a specific external threat, the less democracy can be explained, by that the state was convinced about, the existence of a threat. It is also questionable how much democracy is ‘disturbed’ in case of an external threat. There are many examples of democratic countries, that despite external threats, still determine their foreign policy on completely democratic premises, under unchanged circumstances, and in open democratic institutions. For an example United States and other western European countries during the cold war; US, Denmark and Great Britain that are currently at war, and not least Israel.
Literature
Jackson, Robert and Sorensen, Georg: ‘International relations, theories and approaches’, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003
Layne, Christopher: ‘Kant or Cant, the myth of democratic peace’, International Security, page 5-49, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994
Oneal, John R and Russett, Bruce: ‘Finding peace in a world of hegemony and terrorism’, Oxford University Press and Japan Association of International Relations, 2003
By Poyan Taherloo - November 2005
The liberal tradition in International politics originates from the time around the emergence of the modern liberal states. Liberal philosophers as Locke, Bentham and Kant, saw a great potential for human progress, in civil society and capitalist economy, which could be achieved if the state could ensure the liberty of the individual. The liberal tradition is thus based on the basic assumption regarding an optimistic view of humanity, a linear conception of history and a perception of the state that should be guarantor of the liberty of the individual.
The liberal theory is based on an optimistic view of humanity, where the rational ‘self-interest maximizing’ human is perceived, as being capable of realizing the many common interests, between humans, and the great benefits that can be achieved by cooperation, both nationally and internationally.
Against the backdrop of an optimistic view of humanity, the liberal theory is based on a linear conception of history, where humans are capable of learning from the mistakes of the past, and where the historically accumulated knowledge, constitutes the foundation for lasting progress towards prosperity and cooperation.
In order to succeed in achieving these human progresses, it is necessary that the state upholds law and order, and ensures the liberty and property of the individual.
Based on these assumptions, liberalists argue for, that the human progress, particularly in relation to the modernization processes, will result in increased international cooperation and peace (Jackson and Sorensen 2003:106-108).
Liberal peace
The thesis about ‘liberal peace’ is in many ways very pivotal in the liberal tradition, and derive originally from Immanuel Kant, who in his book ‘Perpetual Peace’, from 1795 set up some preconditions for international peace. It can be derived from Kants original text that international peace depends on the proliferation of democratic governance, economic interdependence together with international law and international organizations (Oneal and Russett 2003:267).
There are hereof three hypotheses, that are each emphasized particularly as part of different schools of liberal theory, but the proliferation of democratic governance is particularly important, why the thesis is also defined as ‘democratic peace’. This is because the individual liberty, as in democratic states, is just the precondition for utilizing the human potential. The first hypotheses is that democracies are more reluctant to use force, particularly against other democracies, than non-democracies, which is pivotal, in Republican liberalism. The second hypotheses is, that economic interdependence constitutes an important incentive for, maintaining peaceful relations between democracies, which is pivotal in Interdependence liberalism. Finally there is a hypotheses about that international organizations influence democracies to avoid war, which is pivotal in Institutional liberalism (Oneal and Russett 2003: 273; Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 112 ff.).
In the thesis regarding liberal peace the three factors, that have significance for peace, are not isolated from each other, but reinforce each other mutually. International relations can for an example develop into peaceful interaction, through mutually beneficial economic trade, ensured by international law, and controlled by - and negotiated in international organizations (Oneal and Russett 2003: 281).
Theoretical argumentation
There are two overall explanations for that democracies are less inclined to wage war against each other. The one explanation is that democratic countries, usually resolve national conflict peacefully through dialog and negotiation, without resorting to threats and violence, and because democracies are aware that other democracies have same norms, they would apply this practice in relation to each other. This is due to not least a respect for the common democratic norms and values, why it will be normal with negotiation and compromise, and unacceptable to use threats and force.
The other reason is that democratic leaders are held accountable for their decisions, that are continuously evaluated in open democratic institutions. Because the expense of war is high, and in the end can cost democratic leaders their power, they are less inclined to wage war. Authoritarian leaders in contrast are not held accountable in the same way, as they can stay in power, by oppressing their populations (Oneal and Russet 2003: 274).
There are accordingly two overall explanations for that increased economic interdependence between democracies reduce the probability for war, between these. The one explanation is that increased trade between states, at the same time result in an increased communication between these, that also reaches beyond a specifically trades related communication, which form a basis for mutual understanding, recognition and cooperation.
The other explanation is that peace between states is crucial for inter-state trade, why increased trade between states means, that there will be greater political opposition to initiating a war, and thereby loosing the economic gain in mutual trade (Oneal and Russet 2003: 275).
There are many explanations to that international organizations effect the behavior of states, so that they are less inclined to wage war. Some of the overall are that international organizations reduce insecurity by providing the member states with information and forums for cooperation and dialog, function as mediator in conflicts between states, influence state norms, clarify common interests and constitute common reference for the states (Oneal and Russett 2003: 276).
Empirical argumentation
One of the studies that confirm the thesis regarding liberal peace, is a statistical analysis of the behavior of states in regard to each other in the period 1885-1992. In this study all states have been set up across each other in pairs, which has given more than 230.000 cases, where a case is the relations between two states in a certain year. Furthermore every state, each year in this period has been placed on a scale over how democratic this state is assessed to be, how much economic interdependence there has been between the state in question and each of the other states, together with how many international organizations the concerned state is member of, that the other state is also member of.
In assessment of the degree of democracy the study has looked at, the presence of institutions and procedures, through which the citizens have the opportunity to express their preferences about alternative politicians and leaders, institutionalized limits on the use of force by the state, together with guaranties for the liberty of the citizens in their everyday and in political participation (Oneal and Russett 2003: 272).
In assessment of the degree of interdependence the study has for each case put together the one country’s’ import and export in relation to the other country, and divided this number with the BNP of the country. In this way the study has reached a number for how much of a certain country’s BNP that consists in trade with the other country in a given case, and thereby the degree of interdependence (Oneal and Russet 2003: 275).
Finally the study has assessed the degree of membership of international organizations, on how many international organizations, which both states in a certain case are members of (Oneal and Russet 2003: 276).
On these grounds the study has calculated the probability of military conflict in a certain case, with a certain place in regard to the three variables, democracy, interdependence and membership of international organizations, and held this probability up against another case, with a different place in regard to these variables. In this way it has been possible to derive the three variable’s influence on the probability of a military conflict between states (Oneal and Russet 2003: 271).
It is important to underline, that the study can identify and demonstrate a connection between variation in the three variables and the probability of conflict between states, but that it is for the theory to explain the specific causal relation (Oneal and Russet 2003: 277).
The result of the statistical analysis shows a clear connection between the three variables and the probability of conflict. This connection is demonstrated by keeping two of the three variables constant, while comparing a case where the last variable is at 90th percentile, with a case where the same variable is at 10th percentile.
The analysis shows that if the least democratic state in a case is located at 90th percentile (near the most democratic end), instead of an authoritarian 10th percentile, the probability of military conflict, is 86 % less. The analysis shows that military conflict between very democratic states are very rare, while conflicts between authoritarian states are much more probable.
Conflicts are furthermore probable in cases with a very democratic state and a very authoritarian state.
The effect of economic interdependence on the probability of military conflict, is not so evident, as with democracy, but the connection can be demonstrated. If the least interdependent of the states in a case is at 90th percentile, the probability of military conflict is reduced with approximately one third, compared to if it was at 10th percentile.
The effect of common membership of an international organization in a certain case, on the probability of conflict, is also very clear. An increase in common membership of international organizations to 90th percentile, reduces the probability of conflict with approximately 40 %.
If all three variables are assessed together, that is the degree of democracy, economic interdependence and common membership of international organizations, are increased to 90th percentile, for the lowest located state in a case, it reduces the probability of military conflict by 95 % (Oneal and Russet 2003: 278).
The reasons of realism against liberal peace theory
Much of the critique of the liberal tradition, originates from the realism tradition. Based on a ‘pessimistic’ view of humanity, realism build on a cyclical perception of history, where ‘history is the same damn thing over again’. The first priority of the states is still to survive, interaction still happens within a state system where anarchy rules, and self-help is still crucial, as no other looks out for the state in such a system, besides the state itself. The states therefor rearm in an attempt to be able to defend themselves, which is perceived as a threat by other states, which also rearm. A situation that in the end results in war between states (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 125).
The common thread in the realism critique of liberal theory, and the thesis of liberal peace, is that there despite great changes in the interaction patterns of states, which realism recognizes, still exists a state system of anarchy, that will continue to exist, and that implies insecurity for the states (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 127).
The argumentation of the realism against republican liberalism is that peace between democracies always can change to war between these, and that ‘today’s friends very well can end up being enemies tomorrow’. Besides there are no guaranties that states will continue to be democracies, and that they will not change into authoritarian states or other forms of non-democracies (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 126).
This argumentation seems as an attempt to underline, that realism still can have greater influence again. Because it is clear, that there is a probability that democracies can wage war against each other, which the thesis of liberal peace does not exclude, and that democracies can get to be non-democracies. But with the proliferation of democracy, and an extensive cooperation between democracies, this probability is severely reduced. There are also examples of democracies, where it would be unimaginable with a return to an authoritarian system, partly because democracy is deeply institutionalized and enjoy very great support among the population, and partly because it would endanger the state’s good relations with other democracies. It is thus unimaginable, that for an example an EU-country would go back to an authoritarian system, and therefor the historic development in these countries are irreversible, on these areas. In the same way the probability of war between these states is extremely small, simply because the cost would be vital, not least because of the very extensive cooperation.
The realism argumentation against Interdependence liberalism is that economic interdependence is not something new, and that this interdependence has not previously been able to prevent war. The share of export of the world’s PNP was less in 1970 than in the years from 1880-1910. The great increase in world trade in the period 1950-1970, which liberalists perceive as sign of greater interdependence, is nothing more than an increase from an unusually low level, due to the two world wars and The great depression, in the first half of the 20th century (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 125).
It is very possible that economic interdependence is not a new phenomenon, but the social - and technological development, not least in the last half of the 20th century, have great significance for how economic interdependence effects the probability of war. Today there is a greater awareness amongst the population regarding the economic interdependence, and which effect it has for the prosperity. Therefor it must be expected that political decisions, that jeopardize inter-state trade, are assessed by the population on different grounds than before.
Furthermore there are many democratic countries, particularly in western Europe, where the population today enjoy a level of prosperity, that has not been the case previously, and which the population is unwilling to jeopardize. What one does not have, one cannot lose, but what one has got use to is difficult to do without, and if this can be avoided, it would be best.
So it may be right that the economic interdependence is not something new, but the development in the political-, social-, and technological areas gives this interdependence an entirely different significance that previously.
The realism also argues against the significance that Liberal institutionalism attribute international organizations. Despite that states cooperate in international organizations, these organizations by themselves do not have any significance. International organizations merely constitute a power based interaction between states, where the strongest wins. Without a supranational power monopoly, the international organizations do not change the fact, that the state system is an anarchy, and that states are self-sustained (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 129).
The question is how much order there nevertheless is in the anarchy, and how much international organizations can influence self-sustained states, without the presence of a supranational power monopoly. Within the social sciences today there are a great approval of that ‘institutions matter’, and that institutions effect the rationales and preferences of the members.
There are many examples of collectively determined common norms, values and strategies, that set limitations on the state’s possibilities, independent of their power position, not least in regard to the EU and WTO. It can not be contradicted that the power position of the states, also have a very great significance within international organizations. But the single state’s power position through international organizations, face the accumulated power that states have together in a common cause, why there comes about a form of order in the system, that despite the absence of a supranational power monopoly, can resemble the national democratic system.
Finally there exist a realist argumentation against the causal logic, that the thesis of liberal peace is based on, namely that democratic governance reduces the probability of war, and thereby effects the international system. Realists argue that the opposite is the case, so that the conditions of the international system’s structure, that determine the external conditions of the states, also have crucial influence on the configuration of the national systems of the states. It is argued that the greater an external threat the state encounters, or finds as encountering, the greater extent the foreign policy of the state will be determined on ‘authoritarian’ grounds, and the more centralized the structure of the political system will be (Layne1994: 45).
But the explanation of the realism is not possible to falsify, because explanations for a state becoming less democratic, always can be found. If there are no evidence of a specific external threat, the less democracy can be explained, by that the state was convinced about, the existence of a threat. It is also questionable how much democracy is ‘disturbed’ in case of an external threat. There are many examples of democratic countries, that despite external threats, still determine their foreign policy on completely democratic premises, under unchanged circumstances, and in open democratic institutions. For an example United States and other western European countries during the cold war; US, Denmark and Great Britain that are currently at war, and not least Israel.
Literature
Jackson, Robert and Sorensen, Georg: ‘International relations, theories and approaches’, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003
Layne, Christopher: ‘Kant or Cant, the myth of democratic peace’, International Security, page 5-49, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994
Oneal, John R and Russett, Bruce: ‘Finding peace in a world of hegemony and terrorism’, Oxford University Press and Japan Association of International Relations, 2003
Thursday 4 July 2019
A THEORY OF JUSTICE BY JOHN RAWLS - 2006
A theory of justice by John Rawls
By Poyan Taherloo - November 2006
As society is a social cooperation with the purpose of advancing the welfare of the participants, there will always exist both conflicts and common interests. There will be common interests because the social cooperation creates basis for mutual benefits, and there will be conflicts in regard to the distribution of the profit, that is just achieved from the cooperation.
Therefor there is need for principles of justice, that are principles for how rights and duties are distributed in accordance to the basic institutions of society and for a fair distribution of advantages and disadvantages in relation to the social cooperation (Rawls 2005: 32).
As such Rawls argues that the primary subject of justice is the fundamental structures of society, that reflect how the most important social institutions distribute basic rights and obligations, and determine the distribution of advantages and disadvantages of the social cooperation. Among the most important social institutions are the political constitution and central social and economic arrangements, as for example the legal protection of the freedom of thought and conscience, macro economy, private property law and the monogamous family. These fundamental structures are the primary subject of justice as their effects are so fundamental and make themselves evident from beginning of life (Rawls 2005: 34 ff.).
A well-organized society is characterized by that everyone deliberately recognizes the same principles of justice, and where the fundamental institutions accommodate and fulfill these principles (Rawls 2005: 32).
Rawls’ theory transcends the limitations of the logic positivism, as the statement on justice, besides an empirical reference, at the same time is referred to normative principles. Rawls finds this as possible because the normative principles are derived on basis of model for normative reasoning, which we all would actually accept (Midtgaard 2005: 16; Rawls 2005: 46).
The basis for Rawls’ formulation of this model for normative argumentation is contract theory, as it is found with Locke, Rousseau and Kant, which Rawls applies in a more abstract form. A contract theory is structured in two steps, as there in the first step is determined an original position, that constitute the framework for the participants following choices. The participants in the original position have the opportunity to stay in this position or move away from it by entering into binding agreements. The decision the participants make is step two (Midtgaard 2005: 18)
In Rawls’ theory the original position is defined as a strictly hypothetical situation, that is expected to lead to certain perception of justice; where justice is the fulfillment of those principles that free and rational individuals, that care for their own preferences, would choose as the fundamental conditions for their social cooperation.
The most pivotal characteristic of the original position, that Rawls formulates, is that no one knows their situation in society, including their economic and social situation, like no one knows their innate abilities as intelligence, strength and the like, together with their perception of right and wrong and phycological dispositions. This original position is an expression of a ’veil of ignorance’. A such position ensure that everyone is set equally in their choice of principles, so that no one can choose principles based on what favorize their own situation. Thus the principles of justice become a result of a fair agreement, why Rawls uses the expression ‘justice as fairness’, because the principles are just agreed upon in a position that is fair (Rawls 2005: 39).
The purpose of the conditions that are present in the original position, is clearly to express the equality between humans ‘as moral persons with a perception of their own preferences and sense of justice’. The purpose is moreover to exclude those principles, that only can be expected to be accepted if one knows their situation in society; which is irrelevant in relation to justice, as they morally considered appear to be arbitrary (Rawls 2005: 45).
Based on these conditions for the original position, the model furthermore represents an instrument for, in a systematic and impartial manner, to reflect on the justice of the institutions that we live by and that in a decisive way effect our opinions and preferences. The original position constitutes the morally seen best condition for reflecting on to which extend the institutions of our society are just, and if they impact us in such a way, that we can find acceptable.
Rawls believes that this is a morally seen necessary abstraction, as the institutions and the corresponding attitudes and values possibly, and may be most definitely, include many injustices. If we consider the justice of the institutions within the boundaries of these institutions, without the abstraction, that is possible by the original position, we would only reproduce the injustices (Midtgaard 2005: 21).
Rawls believes that it based on this model is possible to reach those principles of justice, that can be accepted as foundation for the fundamental structures of society in the start position. But the chosen principles should so to say pass yet another test, for them to be accepted as indicators of justice. Here the principles should be held up against our deliberate and strongest believes of justice, to assess if there is consistence. It is our intuition, that is described as our strongest believes regarding justice, that constitute temporary reference point for, what we assume any of the chosen principles must be consistent with (Rawls 2005: 46).
If a principle does not consist with our intuition, we have the choice between revising this principle or revising our intuition. It is a question about how ‘strong’ or ‘uncompromising’ our intuition is in regard to a given principle. In case that we have very strong moral intuitions about that for example slavery, torture and discrimination are not just, we cannot imagine principles that conflict these intuitions. In other cases we may revise our intuitions in relation to our assessment of the principles, because the intuitions are more ambiguous.
By moving ‘forth and back’ between principles in the start position and our intuitions, where it sometimes is intuitions that are revised and other times are principles that are revised, we reach a point where there is consistency between principles and intuitions. Rawls describes this state as a ‘reflective equilibrium’, where we have reached a perception of the start position, or a perception of justice. This equilibrium is not necessarily stable, and can continuously be disturbed by conditions that should be added the foundation for the selection of principles, which again can result in a revision of principles and intuitions (Rawls 2005: 46).
Rawls furthermore points out that this equilibrium is not an expression of that there can be a state wherefrom it is possible in itself to refer to anything obvious about some principles or intuitions. On the contrary a perception of justice should be perceived as many considerations’ mutual support, and where considerations are consistent in a coherent standpoint (Rawls 2005: 47).
In regard to the prioritizing of the chosen principles in relation to each other, Rawls describes two possible methods. The question regarding priority can be addressed with help from an all-encompassing principle or with help from more principles set up in a serial or lexical order* (Rawls 2005: 65).
Rawls has a declared ambition to elaborate a theory of justice that can constitute an alternative to the utilitarianism, that dominates English language ethic and political philosophy. To that purpose he applies the form of utilitarianism that is expressed by Sidgwicks, that he finds as the clearest and most accessible, which he considers critically in the light of his own theory.
The pivot of this theory is that society is just and thus well-organized, when its most important institutions are arranged so, that it results in the greatest sum of satisfaction, calculated for all the individuals that belong to that society. It is an expression of the principle of chose for the single individual, given as a desire for self-interested utility maximization, which is extended so that it is applied to the union of individuals or the entire society (Rawls 2005: 48 ff.).
It is in this most simple way, by which teleological theories link together the two ethical concepts of the good and the right: ‘the good is defined independent of the right, where after the right is defined as that which maximizes the good’ (Rawls 2005: 50).
Rawls expresses his understanding for why utilitarianism can seem so straight forward, obvious and almost sufficient, and lets it be an open question whether the principle of utility would be chosen as principle of justice in the start position, but at the same time he levels a great deal of critique against this theory.
As a start Rawls does not find it probable that individuals that consider each other as equals and with equal rights to stipulate mutual demands, would reach an agreement on a principle, that will result in worse conditions for some, if only others can enjoy greater sum of benefits.
_________________
* An order that requires the fulfillment of previous principles in this order, before a given principle is considered.
Rawls expresses it among other things as such:
Rawls believes that persons in the start position would choose two principles that although very different both exclude the principle of utility. The first principle demands equality in distribution of fundamental rights and duties, and the other principle demands that social and economic inequalities result in compensated benefits for all, including particularly the most disadvantaged in society (Rawls 2005: 41).
Another substantial critique that Rawls levels against the utilitarianism, originate from the fact that this theory does not question what that is chosen as the good, and which it is right to maximize. It is crucial to obtain the greatest sum of satisfaction, and an assessment of the source of this satisfaction and the quality is not significant. The principles of justice regarding natural law, as an example in form of freedom, prohibition of discrimination and differential treatment, are therefor only recognized as far as these result in greatest satisfaction in society, and can thus also be restricted as far as that would result in greater satisfaction. In justice as fairness the individuals accept the principles of equal liberty for all in the original position, and this cannot be changed. An individual can therefore not claim satisfaction that happens at the cost of others’ liberty, and thereby the original position also puts limitations on what that is reasonable to perceive as self interest (Rawls 2005: 55).
Rawls for one expresses this as such:
It is very difficult to overlook, that Immanuel Kant has been a central source of inspiration for Rawls. This is first and foremost expressed by Rawls’ formulation of the original position and ‘the veil of ignorance’. The core in Kants moral philosophy is his formulation of a universal moral law, the categorical imperative: ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law’. This calls for our abstraction from egoistic inclinations and recognizes other individuals’ equality with our selves (Nerheim 1986: 156).
Kant moreover formulates: ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end’. This is an expression of the respect for the human, and the ideal society, as Kant defines as 'The Kingdom of Ends', where all humans to an equal degree have their liberty accommodated (Grøn 2005: 232). It concerns in other words to put oneself in others’ place and think about a hypothetic others situation, based on humans as free and equal.
What the core of Rawls’ theory of justice contribute to regarding the above, is a tool by which we have the best conditions for putting ourselves in others’ place, namely a hypothetical original position, characterized by the ‘veil of ignorance’.
Kants distinction between theoretical reason, world of the phenomena, and the practical reason, humans’ moral will, is expressed in Rawls’ theory, regarding the substantiation of the selection of principles in the original position. We see this distinction in, that we on the one hand are deeply socially determined and impacted by the institutions that we live by, as parallel to the world of the phenomena where we do not have any liberty. On the other hand we have our intuitions that allow us to reflect on the justice of the institutions that we live by, which correspond to our practical reason with Kant (Midtgaard 2005: 21 ff.; Nerheim 1986: 142).
Moreover there is a number of similarities between Kant and Rawls in their basic theory of science, as for an example that the individual is perceived as autonomous while the social space is considered as arbitrary. Both theories are deontological - build on ethics of duty - and strive for certain universal laws (Notes from lecture).
Both theories, Kants formulation of the categorical imperative as well as Rawls’ formulation of justice as fairness, are a delight for the belief that there are ways for humans to live together in balance with themselves and their surroundings. But the theories however do not seem to correspond with direction for coexistence that reflect our age; whether it is because too many are unable to put themselves in the hypothetical others place, and act accordingly, or that justice as fairness as described by Kant and Rawls does not appeal to us. In 1996 it appeared in UN’s report on development that the worlds' 358 wealthiest single persons had an accumulated fortune that matches 2.5 billion of the worlds' poorest. It is hard to imagine that the development in this relation, to current day, should have changes significantly in benefit of the poor. (Taylor 2000: 2)
Even though there are conditions that contradict our strongest moral intuitions, it seems like the institutional and historic circumstance, prevent many from accepting and trying to implement principles of justice selected in the original position, to much further than the borders of EU, Denmark and maybe even their own front door. Thus it seems to reflect that we are historic individuals that to a crucial degree are impacted by our surroundings, why it can prove difficult to materialize justice as fairness.
There are thus many examples of principles that contradict our strong moral intuitions, as for example liberty and equality, that never less drowned in human apathy, by those who possess the most resources in the world. A situation that will change because it, with formulations of justice, as with Kant and Rawls, is possible to appeal to the human sense of justice, and not least because the consequences of unjust conditions in the world become increasingly more evident.
Litterateur
Grøn, Arne; Husted, Jørgen; Lübcke, Poul; Rasmussen, Stig Alstrup; Sandøe, Peter; and Stefansen, Niels Christian, 2005: ’Politikkens filosofiske leksikon’, Politikkens Forlag, Copenhagen
Midtgaard, Sørenn Flinch, 2005: ’John Rawls’, Roskilde Universitetsforlag, Roskilde
Nerheim, Hjördis and Rossvær, Vigo, 1986: ‘Filosofiens historie fra Sokrates til Wittgenstein’, Politikkens Forlag, Copenhagen
Rawls, John, 2005: ’En teori on retfærdighed’, translated by Mogens Chrom Jacobsen from ‘A theory of justice. Revised Edition’, 1971, Det lille forlag, Frederiksberg
Rawls, John, 1999: A revised edition of ‘A Theory of Justice’, published in 1971 by Harvard University Press
Taylor, Peter J. and Flint, Colin, 2000: ‘Political geography – world economy, nation-state and locality’, Pearson Education, Essex, England
By Poyan Taherloo - November 2006
As society is a social cooperation with the purpose of advancing the welfare of the participants, there will always exist both conflicts and common interests. There will be common interests because the social cooperation creates basis for mutual benefits, and there will be conflicts in regard to the distribution of the profit, that is just achieved from the cooperation.
Therefor there is need for principles of justice, that are principles for how rights and duties are distributed in accordance to the basic institutions of society and for a fair distribution of advantages and disadvantages in relation to the social cooperation (Rawls 2005: 32).
As such Rawls argues that the primary subject of justice is the fundamental structures of society, that reflect how the most important social institutions distribute basic rights and obligations, and determine the distribution of advantages and disadvantages of the social cooperation. Among the most important social institutions are the political constitution and central social and economic arrangements, as for example the legal protection of the freedom of thought and conscience, macro economy, private property law and the monogamous family. These fundamental structures are the primary subject of justice as their effects are so fundamental and make themselves evident from beginning of life (Rawls 2005: 34 ff.).
A well-organized society is characterized by that everyone deliberately recognizes the same principles of justice, and where the fundamental institutions accommodate and fulfill these principles (Rawls 2005: 32).
Rawls’ theory transcends the limitations of the logic positivism, as the statement on justice, besides an empirical reference, at the same time is referred to normative principles. Rawls finds this as possible because the normative principles are derived on basis of model for normative reasoning, which we all would actually accept (Midtgaard 2005: 16; Rawls 2005: 46).
The basis for Rawls’ formulation of this model for normative argumentation is contract theory, as it is found with Locke, Rousseau and Kant, which Rawls applies in a more abstract form. A contract theory is structured in two steps, as there in the first step is determined an original position, that constitute the framework for the participants following choices. The participants in the original position have the opportunity to stay in this position or move away from it by entering into binding agreements. The decision the participants make is step two (Midtgaard 2005: 18)
In Rawls’ theory the original position is defined as a strictly hypothetical situation, that is expected to lead to certain perception of justice; where justice is the fulfillment of those principles that free and rational individuals, that care for their own preferences, would choose as the fundamental conditions for their social cooperation.
The most pivotal characteristic of the original position, that Rawls formulates, is that no one knows their situation in society, including their economic and social situation, like no one knows their innate abilities as intelligence, strength and the like, together with their perception of right and wrong and phycological dispositions. This original position is an expression of a ’veil of ignorance’. A such position ensure that everyone is set equally in their choice of principles, so that no one can choose principles based on what favorize their own situation. Thus the principles of justice become a result of a fair agreement, why Rawls uses the expression ‘justice as fairness’, because the principles are just agreed upon in a position that is fair (Rawls 2005: 39).
The purpose of the conditions that are present in the original position, is clearly to express the equality between humans ‘as moral persons with a perception of their own preferences and sense of justice’. The purpose is moreover to exclude those principles, that only can be expected to be accepted if one knows their situation in society; which is irrelevant in relation to justice, as they morally considered appear to be arbitrary (Rawls 2005: 45).
Based on these conditions for the original position, the model furthermore represents an instrument for, in a systematic and impartial manner, to reflect on the justice of the institutions that we live by and that in a decisive way effect our opinions and preferences. The original position constitutes the morally seen best condition for reflecting on to which extend the institutions of our society are just, and if they impact us in such a way, that we can find acceptable.
Rawls believes that this is a morally seen necessary abstraction, as the institutions and the corresponding attitudes and values possibly, and may be most definitely, include many injustices. If we consider the justice of the institutions within the boundaries of these institutions, without the abstraction, that is possible by the original position, we would only reproduce the injustices (Midtgaard 2005: 21).
Rawls believes that it based on this model is possible to reach those principles of justice, that can be accepted as foundation for the fundamental structures of society in the start position. But the chosen principles should so to say pass yet another test, for them to be accepted as indicators of justice. Here the principles should be held up against our deliberate and strongest believes of justice, to assess if there is consistence. It is our intuition, that is described as our strongest believes regarding justice, that constitute temporary reference point for, what we assume any of the chosen principles must be consistent with (Rawls 2005: 46).
If a principle does not consist with our intuition, we have the choice between revising this principle or revising our intuition. It is a question about how ‘strong’ or ‘uncompromising’ our intuition is in regard to a given principle. In case that we have very strong moral intuitions about that for example slavery, torture and discrimination are not just, we cannot imagine principles that conflict these intuitions. In other cases we may revise our intuitions in relation to our assessment of the principles, because the intuitions are more ambiguous.
By moving ‘forth and back’ between principles in the start position and our intuitions, where it sometimes is intuitions that are revised and other times are principles that are revised, we reach a point where there is consistency between principles and intuitions. Rawls describes this state as a ‘reflective equilibrium’, where we have reached a perception of the start position, or a perception of justice. This equilibrium is not necessarily stable, and can continuously be disturbed by conditions that should be added the foundation for the selection of principles, which again can result in a revision of principles and intuitions (Rawls 2005: 46).
Rawls furthermore points out that this equilibrium is not an expression of that there can be a state wherefrom it is possible in itself to refer to anything obvious about some principles or intuitions. On the contrary a perception of justice should be perceived as many considerations’ mutual support, and where considerations are consistent in a coherent standpoint (Rawls 2005: 47).
In regard to the prioritizing of the chosen principles in relation to each other, Rawls describes two possible methods. The question regarding priority can be addressed with help from an all-encompassing principle or with help from more principles set up in a serial or lexical order* (Rawls 2005: 65).
Rawls has a declared ambition to elaborate a theory of justice that can constitute an alternative to the utilitarianism, that dominates English language ethic and political philosophy. To that purpose he applies the form of utilitarianism that is expressed by Sidgwicks, that he finds as the clearest and most accessible, which he considers critically in the light of his own theory.
The pivot of this theory is that society is just and thus well-organized, when its most important institutions are arranged so, that it results in the greatest sum of satisfaction, calculated for all the individuals that belong to that society. It is an expression of the principle of chose for the single individual, given as a desire for self-interested utility maximization, which is extended so that it is applied to the union of individuals or the entire society (Rawls 2005: 48 ff.).
It is in this most simple way, by which teleological theories link together the two ethical concepts of the good and the right: ‘the good is defined independent of the right, where after the right is defined as that which maximizes the good’ (Rawls 2005: 50).
Rawls expresses his understanding for why utilitarianism can seem so straight forward, obvious and almost sufficient, and lets it be an open question whether the principle of utility would be chosen as principle of justice in the start position, but at the same time he levels a great deal of critique against this theory.
As a start Rawls does not find it probable that individuals that consider each other as equals and with equal rights to stipulate mutual demands, would reach an agreement on a principle, that will result in worse conditions for some, if only others can enjoy greater sum of benefits.
_________________
* An order that requires the fulfillment of previous principles in this order, before a given principle is considered.
Rawls expresses it among other things as such:
“In the absence of strong and lasting benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests. Thus it seems that the principle of utility is incompatible with the conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage.”
(Rawls 1999: 13)
Rawls believes that persons in the start position would choose two principles that although very different both exclude the principle of utility. The first principle demands equality in distribution of fundamental rights and duties, and the other principle demands that social and economic inequalities result in compensated benefits for all, including particularly the most disadvantaged in society (Rawls 2005: 41).
Another substantial critique that Rawls levels against the utilitarianism, originate from the fact that this theory does not question what that is chosen as the good, and which it is right to maximize. It is crucial to obtain the greatest sum of satisfaction, and an assessment of the source of this satisfaction and the quality is not significant. The principles of justice regarding natural law, as an example in form of freedom, prohibition of discrimination and differential treatment, are therefor only recognized as far as these result in greatest satisfaction in society, and can thus also be restricted as far as that would result in greater satisfaction. In justice as fairness the individuals accept the principles of equal liberty for all in the original position, and this cannot be changed. An individual can therefore not claim satisfaction that happens at the cost of others’ liberty, and thereby the original position also puts limitations on what that is reasonable to perceive as self interest (Rawls 2005: 55).
Rawls for one expresses this as such:
“Thus while the contract doctrine accepts our convictions about the priority of justice as on the whole sound, utilitarianism seeks to account for them as a socially useful illusion.”
(Rawls: 25)
It is very difficult to overlook, that Immanuel Kant has been a central source of inspiration for Rawls. This is first and foremost expressed by Rawls’ formulation of the original position and ‘the veil of ignorance’. The core in Kants moral philosophy is his formulation of a universal moral law, the categorical imperative: ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law’. This calls for our abstraction from egoistic inclinations and recognizes other individuals’ equality with our selves (Nerheim 1986: 156).
Kant moreover formulates: ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end’. This is an expression of the respect for the human, and the ideal society, as Kant defines as 'The Kingdom of Ends', where all humans to an equal degree have their liberty accommodated (Grøn 2005: 232). It concerns in other words to put oneself in others’ place and think about a hypothetic others situation, based on humans as free and equal.
What the core of Rawls’ theory of justice contribute to regarding the above, is a tool by which we have the best conditions for putting ourselves in others’ place, namely a hypothetical original position, characterized by the ‘veil of ignorance’.
Kants distinction between theoretical reason, world of the phenomena, and the practical reason, humans’ moral will, is expressed in Rawls’ theory, regarding the substantiation of the selection of principles in the original position. We see this distinction in, that we on the one hand are deeply socially determined and impacted by the institutions that we live by, as parallel to the world of the phenomena where we do not have any liberty. On the other hand we have our intuitions that allow us to reflect on the justice of the institutions that we live by, which correspond to our practical reason with Kant (Midtgaard 2005: 21 ff.; Nerheim 1986: 142).
Moreover there is a number of similarities between Kant and Rawls in their basic theory of science, as for an example that the individual is perceived as autonomous while the social space is considered as arbitrary. Both theories are deontological - build on ethics of duty - and strive for certain universal laws (Notes from lecture).
Both theories, Kants formulation of the categorical imperative as well as Rawls’ formulation of justice as fairness, are a delight for the belief that there are ways for humans to live together in balance with themselves and their surroundings. But the theories however do not seem to correspond with direction for coexistence that reflect our age; whether it is because too many are unable to put themselves in the hypothetical others place, and act accordingly, or that justice as fairness as described by Kant and Rawls does not appeal to us. In 1996 it appeared in UN’s report on development that the worlds' 358 wealthiest single persons had an accumulated fortune that matches 2.5 billion of the worlds' poorest. It is hard to imagine that the development in this relation, to current day, should have changes significantly in benefit of the poor. (Taylor 2000: 2)
Even though there are conditions that contradict our strongest moral intuitions, it seems like the institutional and historic circumstance, prevent many from accepting and trying to implement principles of justice selected in the original position, to much further than the borders of EU, Denmark and maybe even their own front door. Thus it seems to reflect that we are historic individuals that to a crucial degree are impacted by our surroundings, why it can prove difficult to materialize justice as fairness.
There are thus many examples of principles that contradict our strong moral intuitions, as for example liberty and equality, that never less drowned in human apathy, by those who possess the most resources in the world. A situation that will change because it, with formulations of justice, as with Kant and Rawls, is possible to appeal to the human sense of justice, and not least because the consequences of unjust conditions in the world become increasingly more evident.
Litterateur
Grøn, Arne; Husted, Jørgen; Lübcke, Poul; Rasmussen, Stig Alstrup; Sandøe, Peter; and Stefansen, Niels Christian, 2005: ’Politikkens filosofiske leksikon’, Politikkens Forlag, Copenhagen
Midtgaard, Sørenn Flinch, 2005: ’John Rawls’, Roskilde Universitetsforlag, Roskilde
Nerheim, Hjördis and Rossvær, Vigo, 1986: ‘Filosofiens historie fra Sokrates til Wittgenstein’, Politikkens Forlag, Copenhagen
Rawls, John, 2005: ’En teori on retfærdighed’, translated by Mogens Chrom Jacobsen from ‘A theory of justice. Revised Edition’, 1971, Det lille forlag, Frederiksberg
Rawls, John, 1999: A revised edition of ‘A Theory of Justice’, published in 1971 by Harvard University Press
Taylor, Peter J. and Flint, Colin, 2000: ‘Political geography – world economy, nation-state and locality’, Pearson Education, Essex, England
Wednesday 3 July 2019
PRIORITIZING OF THE GOOD OR THE RIGHT - 2007
Prioritizing of the good or the right
By Poyan Taherloo - April 2007
Critique consists of the human activity of passing judgments, that are substantiated with reference to one or more standards. Critique is often associated with the modern or the enlightenment, where humans set up standards, without being subjected the traditional authorities. This human emancipation process, also conditioned by the historic development of reason together with the establishment of a knowledge autonomy and authority, necessitates critique, as humans define the conditions for legitimate reasons, in order to determine what that can be known, what that can be done and what that can be hoped for. (Foucault: 28)
Critique of social conditions that can generally be defined as social critique, can be classified according to different ideal types of critique forms. It is possible to distinguish between these critique forms, as they refer to different standards in substantiation of their critique (Compendium: 1). There can be distinguished between 6 ideal types of critique*, and in the following are further explained critique as definition of social pathologies, based on Axel Honneth, together with moral philosophically substantiated critique, based on Nancy Fraser. These critique forms and their societal function and meaning are then discussed, with inclusion of a theory of justice by Reinar Forst, that can be characterized as foundation for a moral philosophical critique.
In critique as definition of social pathologies the task consists in identifying development tendencies in society, that can be judged as maldevelopments or even as social pathologies, with or without direct reference to standards. It is thus the task for this critique, to diagnose such pathologies and assign an appropriate cure. (Compendium: 1)
In an attempt to specify the task of the social philosophy in ‘Pathologies of the social: The past and present of social philosophy’, Axel Honneth points out that the discipline depends on its ability to, in a convincing manner, substantiate ethical judgments concerning necessary preconditions for human life (Honneth: 393).
If the discipline wants to criticize those development processes that can be characterized as maldevelopments or sick, it is thus crucial which standards that are formulated for assessment of these development processes, and with that which development processes that can be assessed as healthy. The precondition for assessing something as wrong or sick, is in other words a credible definition of what that is right or healthy. (Honneth: 387)
_________________
* The technocratic scientistic critique, the pragmatic critique, critique of actual contradistinctions, the immanent critique, critique as defining social pathologies and the moral philosophically substantiated critique (Compendium: 1 ff.)
Based on a study of contemporary diagnoses produced by philosophers and sociologists as among others Rousseau and Hobbes together with Hegel, Marx, Horkheimer, Adorno, Arendt and Foucault, Honneth derives that common for them is that they in each particular way fundamentally are convinced that a social activity that constitute the very basic preconditions for human life, is threatened by an accelerating proliferation of industrialization (Honneth: 391).
Honneth points to contemporary diagnose by Rousseaus, of the social life as alienated in relation to the initial human existence, as the first time that social lifeforms, besides their political moral legitimacy, are examined in regard to the structural conditions they impose an aim of human self-realization (Honneth: 375).
From Simmel, Tönnis and Weber to Dürkheim, Honneth points out, that they all were concerned with the historical process that together with the establishment of a new economic order in their age, had resulted in a moral starvation of the social life (Honneth: 381).
With Marx this is expressed in, his attempts to identify the preconditions for capitalism that lead to a social alienation. It concerns the preconditions for capitalism, that constitute barriers for a process of human self-determined work, as Marx believes is a condition for human self-realization (Honneth: 337).
With Arendt it is expressed in her thesis about, the progressing industrialization which means that the technical form of activity and work archives a social dominance, which is so powerful that it threatens completely to suppress the emancipatory practice in public discussion and communication (Honneth: 384).
Based on this study of diagnoses, of which some are mentioned above, Honneth formulates a definition of the normal or healthy that is to constitute the standard for assessment of social pathologies. According to Honneth it is possible to assess if society is moving in the right direction by, assessing how far the society ensures more and more conditions of possibility for human self-realization, as he formulates as such:
This must be ensured by establishing a weak formalistic anthropology, that can function as the methodologic strategy for substantiation of the critique. In part this must be so abstract, that it cannot be accused of representing a specific interpretation of the good life, and in part it must be more specific than Kantian reference to the humans’ individual autonomy. It is a matter of a weak formalistic anthropology, as the theory does not formulate how the good life specifically should be lived, but only formulate the most basic preconditions for human self-realization. (Honneth: 394, Juul: 6)
Within critique as a moral philosophically substantiated critique, judgment is passed with explicit reference to normative standards, based on a deontological, teleological or ontological ethic (Compendium: 1). It is the task of the critique to pass judgement regarding for example unjust conditions based on a reference to normative standards for justice.
An example of normative standards that can be applied in a critique of society conditions, that can be judged on that basis, is a theory of justice formulated by Nancy Fraser. Frasers theory is a deontological theory of justice, that brings together a demand regarding socioeconomic redistribution with a demand regarding cultural recognition and political representation. In her theory of justice Fraser thus rejects that a theory cannot include standards for both recognition and redistribution, which she describes as a false antithesis (Fraser: 9 ff.).
In her argumentation Fraser for example points out groups, that can be subjected to both lack of recognition and lack of allocation of economic means, where no one of these conditions are directly derived from each other, why a one-dimensional theory of justice, that is only oriented towards either recognition or redistribution, is not able to include these groups’ situation. It can among other things be groups with specific gender, race or sexuality, but Fraser argues that there always will be both aspects of recognition and redistribution in regard to these groups, but that the weight will be placed differently according to the base of injustice towards a certain group. (Fraser: 25 ff.)
Fraser formulates a theory of justice where the normative core is a concept called “Parity of participation”. According to this norm justice presuppose social arrangements, that allow all members of society to interact with each other as equals. For Parity of participation to be possible there is at least two conditions that should be fulfilled, which Fraser calls Objective condition and Intersubjective condition. According to Objective condition the distribution of material resources should be arranged so that the members’ independence is ensured. According to Intersubjective condition the institutionalized circumstances regarding cultural values should express equal respect for all members, and ensure equal opportunities to achieve social recognition. (Fraser: 36)
As such Frasers theory of justice, formulated based on Parity of participation, includes both recognition and redistribution, without these being reduced to each other, and Fraser therefor calls the theory two-dimensional (Fraser: 37).
Parity of participation thus constitutes the base for assessment of injustice, whether it is regarding recognition or redistribution, as demands for social change in society are assessed with reference to whether they promote Parity of participation. In regard to redistribution, economic reforms are to be justified by, that they provide conditions, that can ensure full participation for some who are excluded from this, at the same time as they do not result in new or deteriorated inequalities on other areas, that cannot be justified.
In regard to recognition changes in the sociocultural institutions are justified by, that they favor circumstances that ensure the Intersubjective condition, while they do not result in creation or deterioration of unjust inequalities on other areas. As such Parity of participation constitute the base for assessment of injustice and demands for social and economic reforms in relation to the injustice. (Fraser: 39)
Critique as definition of social pathologies, as described based on Honneth, with reference to the normative as the extent of conditions of possibility for the humans’ self-realization, have as function to point out barriers to the good life and assign initiatives by which they can be overcome. With focus on an ethical question regarding conditions for the good life, as conditions of possibility of self-realization, Honneth has been criticized for not having view for the moral question regarding social justice. According to Fraser it can be derived from Honneths theory of recognition, that all demands for recognition should be accommodated, while it is not specified how specific demands for recognition should be assessed. According to Fraser demands for social reforms, regarding recognition and redistribution, should be possible to assess with reference to an existing moral injustice. In the discussion with Honneth, Fraser puts the ideal regarding justice higher than the ideal regarding self-realization, and makes the aspect of recognition to just one dimension in a two-dimensional theory of justice. (Juul: 11)
Honneth criticizes Frasers theory of justice for being without ethical basis and for taking an unclear position between ethical and deontological understandings of justice. According to Honneth, Fraser thus lacks an ethical argumentation for the ideal regarding Parity of participation, which at the same time is to substantial to be characterized as deontological principle.
Honneth moreover criticizes Frasers distinction between demands for recognition and redistribution, as he finds that they originate from the same rationale. According to Honneth both of these demands arise as a reaction to groups’ experience of violation, that result in a struggle for social rights and recognition.
In relation to assessment of specific demands for recognition, Honneth believes that it as a basis are demands that contribute positively to development of conditions of social recognition, that can be perceived as normatively substantiated. (Juul: 12)
But this basis that Honneth formulates for assessment of demands for recognition seem very abstract and insufficient, why his theory of recognition with focus on the good life lacks to consider how conditions for recognition can be distributed in a just manner.
In relation to the function and meaning of the critique it is thus a question of what the focus, basis or core is in the standards that constitute the basis for substantiation of a judgment. Should it be an ethical concern regarding the good life, that is pivotal, or should it be a moral concern regarding the right, and which relation is there between these matters.
Based on an analysis of the controversy between “context-forgetful” liberalists and “context-obsessed” communitarianists, Forst formulates a theory of justice, that include both the good and the right, as the theory links recognition of ethical identities, with recognition of individual rights, democratic procedure and universal moral principles. (Juul: 12)
Among other things through an analysis of the relation between ethic and law, Forst shows that ethical values and universal norms are expressions of different solutions to different questions, that are linked with different criteria for validity (Forst: 28).
Forst for one thing expresses it as such:
As such Forst differentiates between four normative contexts in which the human is included, that are linked but cannot be reduced to each other. It is the human as an ethical person, juridical person, citizen and moral person. I that regard a just society is a place where persons’ ethical identity is recognized and legally protected, by politically and autonomously proposed laws in a political community consisting of fully members, and where the law possesses a moral core that respects persons’ moral integrity (Forst: 230 ff.).
With regard to those situations where ethical, political and moral norms are in conflict with each other, the answer should be found in practical discourses between responsible citizens, and thereby Forst eventually puts his trust in the practical reason or judgment (Juul: 14).
Forsts theory thus include both the ethical question regarding the good life and the moral question regarding the right, while the theory integrates these with questions about individual juridical and political rights, at the same time as formulating criteria for validity in argumentation together with an intersubjective perspective on contexts of individual and society (Forst: 274).
In the light of Forsts theory it seems difficult to see how a normative theory of social science, as standard for substantiation of critique, can be assessed as sufficient, if it only concerns either the good or the right.
Literature
Forst, Reinar: “Context of Justice – Political philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism”, University of California Press
Foucault, Michael: “What Is Enlightment ?”, in Raibinow, P. (red.): “The Foucault Reader”, London: Penguin Press
Fraser, Nancy and Honneth, Axel: “Redistribution or Recognition? – A Political-Pholosophical Exchange”, translated by Golb, Joel; Ingram, James and Wilke, Christiane, London: Verso
Honneth, Axel: “Pathologies of the social: The past and present of social philosophy” in Rasmussen, David: “Handbook in Critical Theory”
Compendium for Project – and substitution seminar: The landscape of critique, Spring semester 2007, course responsible: Stormhøj, Christel
By Poyan Taherloo - April 2007
Critique consists of the human activity of passing judgments, that are substantiated with reference to one or more standards. Critique is often associated with the modern or the enlightenment, where humans set up standards, without being subjected the traditional authorities. This human emancipation process, also conditioned by the historic development of reason together with the establishment of a knowledge autonomy and authority, necessitates critique, as humans define the conditions for legitimate reasons, in order to determine what that can be known, what that can be done and what that can be hoped for. (Foucault: 28)
Critique of social conditions that can generally be defined as social critique, can be classified according to different ideal types of critique forms. It is possible to distinguish between these critique forms, as they refer to different standards in substantiation of their critique (Compendium: 1). There can be distinguished between 6 ideal types of critique*, and in the following are further explained critique as definition of social pathologies, based on Axel Honneth, together with moral philosophically substantiated critique, based on Nancy Fraser. These critique forms and their societal function and meaning are then discussed, with inclusion of a theory of justice by Reinar Forst, that can be characterized as foundation for a moral philosophical critique.
In critique as definition of social pathologies the task consists in identifying development tendencies in society, that can be judged as maldevelopments or even as social pathologies, with or without direct reference to standards. It is thus the task for this critique, to diagnose such pathologies and assign an appropriate cure. (Compendium: 1)
In an attempt to specify the task of the social philosophy in ‘Pathologies of the social: The past and present of social philosophy’, Axel Honneth points out that the discipline depends on its ability to, in a convincing manner, substantiate ethical judgments concerning necessary preconditions for human life (Honneth: 393).
If the discipline wants to criticize those development processes that can be characterized as maldevelopments or sick, it is thus crucial which standards that are formulated for assessment of these development processes, and with that which development processes that can be assessed as healthy. The precondition for assessing something as wrong or sick, is in other words a credible definition of what that is right or healthy. (Honneth: 387)
_________________
* The technocratic scientistic critique, the pragmatic critique, critique of actual contradistinctions, the immanent critique, critique as defining social pathologies and the moral philosophically substantiated critique (Compendium: 1 ff.)
Based on a study of contemporary diagnoses produced by philosophers and sociologists as among others Rousseau and Hobbes together with Hegel, Marx, Horkheimer, Adorno, Arendt and Foucault, Honneth derives that common for them is that they in each particular way fundamentally are convinced that a social activity that constitute the very basic preconditions for human life, is threatened by an accelerating proliferation of industrialization (Honneth: 391).
Honneth points to contemporary diagnose by Rousseaus, of the social life as alienated in relation to the initial human existence, as the first time that social lifeforms, besides their political moral legitimacy, are examined in regard to the structural conditions they impose an aim of human self-realization (Honneth: 375).
From Simmel, Tönnis and Weber to Dürkheim, Honneth points out, that they all were concerned with the historical process that together with the establishment of a new economic order in their age, had resulted in a moral starvation of the social life (Honneth: 381).
With Marx this is expressed in, his attempts to identify the preconditions for capitalism that lead to a social alienation. It concerns the preconditions for capitalism, that constitute barriers for a process of human self-determined work, as Marx believes is a condition for human self-realization (Honneth: 337).
With Arendt it is expressed in her thesis about, the progressing industrialization which means that the technical form of activity and work archives a social dominance, which is so powerful that it threatens completely to suppress the emancipatory practice in public discussion and communication (Honneth: 384).
Based on this study of diagnoses, of which some are mentioned above, Honneth formulates a definition of the normal or healthy that is to constitute the standard for assessment of social pathologies. According to Honneth it is possible to assess if society is moving in the right direction by, assessing how far the society ensures more and more conditions of possibility for human self-realization, as he formulates as such:
“In this way ethical representation of social normality, which derives from the conditions of possibility of self-realization, represent the scale from which social pathologies are measured.”
(Honneth: 388)
“In sum, we can say that the determination of social pathologies in social philosophy always proceeds with a view to the social conditions that can promote the individual’s self-realization.”
(Honneth: 390)
This must be ensured by establishing a weak formalistic anthropology, that can function as the methodologic strategy for substantiation of the critique. In part this must be so abstract, that it cannot be accused of representing a specific interpretation of the good life, and in part it must be more specific than Kantian reference to the humans’ individual autonomy. It is a matter of a weak formalistic anthropology, as the theory does not formulate how the good life specifically should be lived, but only formulate the most basic preconditions for human self-realization. (Honneth: 394, Juul: 6)
Within critique as a moral philosophically substantiated critique, judgment is passed with explicit reference to normative standards, based on a deontological, teleological or ontological ethic (Compendium: 1). It is the task of the critique to pass judgement regarding for example unjust conditions based on a reference to normative standards for justice.
An example of normative standards that can be applied in a critique of society conditions, that can be judged on that basis, is a theory of justice formulated by Nancy Fraser. Frasers theory is a deontological theory of justice, that brings together a demand regarding socioeconomic redistribution with a demand regarding cultural recognition and political representation. In her theory of justice Fraser thus rejects that a theory cannot include standards for both recognition and redistribution, which she describes as a false antithesis (Fraser: 9 ff.).
In her argumentation Fraser for example points out groups, that can be subjected to both lack of recognition and lack of allocation of economic means, where no one of these conditions are directly derived from each other, why a one-dimensional theory of justice, that is only oriented towards either recognition or redistribution, is not able to include these groups’ situation. It can among other things be groups with specific gender, race or sexuality, but Fraser argues that there always will be both aspects of recognition and redistribution in regard to these groups, but that the weight will be placed differently according to the base of injustice towards a certain group. (Fraser: 25 ff.)
Fraser formulates a theory of justice where the normative core is a concept called “Parity of participation”. According to this norm justice presuppose social arrangements, that allow all members of society to interact with each other as equals. For Parity of participation to be possible there is at least two conditions that should be fulfilled, which Fraser calls Objective condition and Intersubjective condition. According to Objective condition the distribution of material resources should be arranged so that the members’ independence is ensured. According to Intersubjective condition the institutionalized circumstances regarding cultural values should express equal respect for all members, and ensure equal opportunities to achieve social recognition. (Fraser: 36)
As such Frasers theory of justice, formulated based on Parity of participation, includes both recognition and redistribution, without these being reduced to each other, and Fraser therefor calls the theory two-dimensional (Fraser: 37).
Parity of participation thus constitutes the base for assessment of injustice, whether it is regarding recognition or redistribution, as demands for social change in society are assessed with reference to whether they promote Parity of participation. In regard to redistribution, economic reforms are to be justified by, that they provide conditions, that can ensure full participation for some who are excluded from this, at the same time as they do not result in new or deteriorated inequalities on other areas, that cannot be justified.
In regard to recognition changes in the sociocultural institutions are justified by, that they favor circumstances that ensure the Intersubjective condition, while they do not result in creation or deterioration of unjust inequalities on other areas. As such Parity of participation constitute the base for assessment of injustice and demands for social and economic reforms in relation to the injustice. (Fraser: 39)
Critique as definition of social pathologies, as described based on Honneth, with reference to the normative as the extent of conditions of possibility for the humans’ self-realization, have as function to point out barriers to the good life and assign initiatives by which they can be overcome. With focus on an ethical question regarding conditions for the good life, as conditions of possibility of self-realization, Honneth has been criticized for not having view for the moral question regarding social justice. According to Fraser it can be derived from Honneths theory of recognition, that all demands for recognition should be accommodated, while it is not specified how specific demands for recognition should be assessed. According to Fraser demands for social reforms, regarding recognition and redistribution, should be possible to assess with reference to an existing moral injustice. In the discussion with Honneth, Fraser puts the ideal regarding justice higher than the ideal regarding self-realization, and makes the aspect of recognition to just one dimension in a two-dimensional theory of justice. (Juul: 11)
Honneth criticizes Frasers theory of justice for being without ethical basis and for taking an unclear position between ethical and deontological understandings of justice. According to Honneth, Fraser thus lacks an ethical argumentation for the ideal regarding Parity of participation, which at the same time is to substantial to be characterized as deontological principle.
Honneth moreover criticizes Frasers distinction between demands for recognition and redistribution, as he finds that they originate from the same rationale. According to Honneth both of these demands arise as a reaction to groups’ experience of violation, that result in a struggle for social rights and recognition.
In relation to assessment of specific demands for recognition, Honneth believes that it as a basis are demands that contribute positively to development of conditions of social recognition, that can be perceived as normatively substantiated. (Juul: 12)
But this basis that Honneth formulates for assessment of demands for recognition seem very abstract and insufficient, why his theory of recognition with focus on the good life lacks to consider how conditions for recognition can be distributed in a just manner.
In relation to the function and meaning of the critique it is thus a question of what the focus, basis or core is in the standards that constitute the basis for substantiation of a judgment. Should it be an ethical concern regarding the good life, that is pivotal, or should it be a moral concern regarding the right, and which relation is there between these matters.
Based on an analysis of the controversy between “context-forgetful” liberalists and “context-obsessed” communitarianists, Forst formulates a theory of justice, that include both the good and the right, as the theory links recognition of ethical identities, with recognition of individual rights, democratic procedure and universal moral principles. (Juul: 12)
Among other things through an analysis of the relation between ethic and law, Forst shows that ethical values and universal norms are expressions of different solutions to different questions, that are linked with different criteria for validity (Forst: 28).
Forst for one thing expresses it as such:
“To recognize a person as an equal bearer of rights is one thing; it is quite another to recognize this person who he or she is in all his or her attributes.”
(Forst: 27)
As such Forst differentiates between four normative contexts in which the human is included, that are linked but cannot be reduced to each other. It is the human as an ethical person, juridical person, citizen and moral person. I that regard a just society is a place where persons’ ethical identity is recognized and legally protected, by politically and autonomously proposed laws in a political community consisting of fully members, and where the law possesses a moral core that respects persons’ moral integrity (Forst: 230 ff.).
With regard to those situations where ethical, political and moral norms are in conflict with each other, the answer should be found in practical discourses between responsible citizens, and thereby Forst eventually puts his trust in the practical reason or judgment (Juul: 14).
Forsts theory thus include both the ethical question regarding the good life and the moral question regarding the right, while the theory integrates these with questions about individual juridical and political rights, at the same time as formulating criteria for validity in argumentation together with an intersubjective perspective on contexts of individual and society (Forst: 274).
In the light of Forsts theory it seems difficult to see how a normative theory of social science, as standard for substantiation of critique, can be assessed as sufficient, if it only concerns either the good or the right.
Literature
Forst, Reinar: “Context of Justice – Political philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism”, University of California Press
Foucault, Michael: “What Is Enlightment ?”, in Raibinow, P. (red.): “The Foucault Reader”, London: Penguin Press
Fraser, Nancy and Honneth, Axel: “Redistribution or Recognition? – A Political-Pholosophical Exchange”, translated by Golb, Joel; Ingram, James and Wilke, Christiane, London: Verso
Honneth, Axel: “Pathologies of the social: The past and present of social philosophy” in Rasmussen, David: “Handbook in Critical Theory”
Compendium for Project – and substitution seminar: The landscape of critique, Spring semester 2007, course responsible: Stormhøj, Christel
Tuesday 19 March 2019
THE CONCEPT OF WORSHIP IN ISLAM
The concept of Worship in Islam
World Assembly of Muslim Youth
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
The concept of worship in Islam differs from that found in other religions, and is therefore subject to misunderstanding. In general, worship is understood to mean the observance of certain rituals: praying, fasting, giving charity, and other "good" works. In Islam, however, worship is much more-it is one's entire life. As many Muslim scholars have said: "Worship is an all-inclusive term for those internal and external sayings and actions of a person that are pleasing to Allah."
In other words, worship is that which is done in obedience to Allah's will, which obviously includes rituals but goes far beyond to the realms of ones beliefs, social activities, and personal contributions to one's society and fellow human beings.
Islam looks at the individual as a whole. He is required to submit completely to Allah, as the Qur'an instructed the prophet Muhammad to do: Say (O Muhammad) my prayer, my sacrifice, my life and my death belong to Allah; He has no partner and I am ordered to be among those who submit, i.e.; Muslims. The natural result of this submission is that one's activities should conform to the instructions of the one to whom the person is submitting-Allah. Islam requires that its followers conduct every aspect of their lives according to its teachings. This might sound strange to those who view religion as a personal relation between the individual and God and as having no impact on those activities that are not connected specifically with any religious rituals.
The Prophet taught his followers that Islam is far more than a private personal matter. Islam attaches no value to rituals that are performed mechanically and have no influence on one's inner life. The Qur'an dealt with this issue when it addressed Muslims, as well as local Jews and Christians, during the dispute that arose when the prayer direction was changed from Jerusalem to the Ka'bah in Makkah:
It is not righteousness that you turn your faces toward the East or the West, but righteous is he who believes in Allah and the Last Day and the Angels and the Book and the Prophets, and gives his beloved money to the relatives and the orphans and the needy Andover the ransoming of the captives, and who observes prayer and pays the poor-due, and those who fulfill their promises when they have made one, and the patient in poverty and affliction and the steadfast in time of war; it is those who have proved truthful and it is those who are the God-fearing. (2:177)
The deeds mentioned in the above verse are indications that a person is righteous. But they are only a part of worship. Faith, according to the Prophet, is the basis of worship and "is made up of sixty and some branches: the highest of which is the belief in the Oneness of Allah, i.e., there is no God but Allah and the lowest in the scale of worship is removing obstacles and dirt from people's way"
Honest work is considered a type of worship. The Prophet said: "Whoever finds himself at the nightfall tired of his work, God will forgive his sins." Seeking knowledge is one of the highest types of worship. The Prophet told his Companions that "seeking knowledge is a (religious) duty on every Muslim." He also said: "Seeking knowledge for one hour is better than praying for seventy years. " Social courtesy and cooperation, when done for the sake of Allah, are also a part of worship: "Receiving your friend with a smile is a type of charity, helping a person to load his animal is a charity, and putting some water in your neighbor's bucket is a charity"
In Islam, the performing one's duties is also considered an act of worship. The Prophet told us that whatever one spends for his family will be counted as an acts of worship for which he will be rewarded, provided that he has acquired it through Islamically acceptable means. Kindness to family members, no matter how small, are also viewed as acts of worship. Even activities that we enjoy very much, such as sexual relations with one's spouse, are considered acts of worship as long as they are performed in accordance with the relevant Qur'anic and prophetic guidelines. For example, the Prophet once told his Companions that they would be rewarded even for engaging in sex with their wives. They were astonished and asked: "Are we to be rewarded for doing something that we enjoy very much?" The Prophet replied: "If you satisfy your desires illegally, will you be punished?" They replied, "Yes. " "So," he said, "by satisfying it legally with your wives you will be rewarded."
It is clear from the previous discussion that the concept of worship in Islam is a comprehensive concept that includes all of the positive activities engaged in by an individual. This is in agreement with the all-inclusive nature of Islam, which regulates life on the individual, social, economic, political, spiritual, and all other levels of one's life. This minute attention to one's activities is the reason why the Qur'an and the example and sayings of the Prophet deal with all aspects of an individual's and a society's life. As following these guidelines is an act of obedience to Allah, He considers them as acts of worship. This very positive attitude encourages individuals to follow the relevant guidelines and thus to bring about personal and social transformation. It also causes an individual to internalize the guidelines, for even if no one is watching him, he knows that Allah is watching him.
Discussing non-ritualistic types of worship first does not mean that the ritualistic ones have less importance. In fact, if the latter are performed correctly and sincerely, the elevate the individual both spiritually and morally and actually help him to live a righteous life according to the guidance of Allah.
Islam has several ritualistic activities that all Muslims are expected to perform. The most important one is the prayer (salah), which must be performed according to a specific style. Its importance derives from the fact that it serves as the distinctive trait of a Muslim and because it prevents a Muslim from engaging in sinful activities by putting him into direct contact with Allah five times a day. Thus, the ritual prayer is a chance for him to renew his covenant with Allah and to seek His guidance anew. As it says in the Qur'an: You alone do we worship and to You alone do we turn for help. Guide us to the straight path (1:4-.5). Actually, the ritual prayer is the first practical manifestation of the Islamic faith and is the main condition for a Muslim's success: Successful indeed are the believers who are humble in their prayers. (23:1-2)
This has also been emphasized by the Prophet, who said: "Those who offer their prayer with great care and punctuality will find it a light, a proof of their faith and a cause of their salvation on the Day of Judgment."
The second most important pillar of Islam is zakat, a term that signifies giving to the less fortunate a certain percentage of one's earnings and holdings. Giving the poor-due and performing the prayer are usually mentioned together in the Qur'an, for they are both visible manifestations of one's Islamic faith and belief that Allah is the sole owner of everything in the universe, which he allows man to enjoy as His trustee for a specific period of time: Believe in Allah and His Messenger and spend of that over which He made you trustees (57:7). In this respect, giving one's poor-due is an act of devotion that, like prayer, brings the believer nearer to his Lord.
In addition, this act provides a means to redistribute a society's wealth in a way that reduces differences between classes and groups. It makes an important contribution to social stability, for by purging the soul of the rich person from selfishness and the soul of the poor from envy and resentment against society, it blocks the channels leading to class hatred and makes it possible for the springs of brotherhood and solidarity to gush forth. Such stability is not merely based on the personal feelings of the rich: it stands on a firmly established right that, if denied by the rich, would be exacted by force, if necessary.
The month-long fast of Ramadan (siyam) is the third pillar of Islam. Its main function is to make the Muslim pure from "within," just as the external legal code (the Shari'ah) makes his external actions pure. This process of purification makes it possible for him to respond to what is true and good and to shun what is false and evil. As stated in the Qur'an: O you who believe, fasting is prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, that you may gain piety (2:183). In an authentic tradition, the Prophet reported Allah as saying: "He suspends eating, drinking, and gratification of his sexual passion for My sake. " Thus his reward is going to be according to God's great bounty.
Fasting, then, awakens an individual's conscience and gives it scope for exercise in a communal experience that is engaged in by the entire Muslim world at the same time. Such a ritual strengthens the individual's resolve to improve himself and to realize the purpose of the whole undertaking. Fasting offers a compulsory rest to the over-worked human body for the duration of one full month, and also reminds Muslims of those who are deprived of life's necessities throughout the year or throughout one's life. It makes him realize the suffering of his less fortunate Muslim brothers, a feeling that promotes in him a sense of sympathy and kindness towards Muslims and other people in general.
Lastly, we come to the annual pilgrimage to the House of Allah (the Ka'bah) in Makkah. This ritual, known as the hadj, is unique to Islam. Muslims from all comers of the world and all attired in the same clothing respond in one voice and one language with the following phrase upon entering the sacred precincts: "labbayk Allahuma Labbayk" (Here I am at your service O Lord!). This is a time of strict self-discipline and control where not only sacred things are revered, but even the life of plants and birds is made inviolable: And he that venerates the sacred things of God, it shall be better for him with his Lord (22:30) as well as And he that venerates the way marks of God, it surely is from devotion of the heart (22:32).
Pilgrimage gives an opportunity for all Muslims, regardless of their affiliations with certain groups, classes, organizations, and governments, to meet annually in a great congress. The time and venue of this congress has been set by God. All Muslims are invited to attend, for no individual or government can deny any Muslim the right to do so. Every Muslim who attends is guaranteed full safety and freedom as long as he does not violate its sanctity.
Thus, worship in Islam, whether ritual or non-ritual, trains the individual in such a way that he loves his Creator even more, which causes him to gain an unyielding will and spins to wipe out all evil and oppression from his society and to make the word of God triumphant.
-
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
Saudi Arabia
World Assembly of Muslim Youth
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
The concept of worship in Islam differs from that found in other religions, and is therefore subject to misunderstanding. In general, worship is understood to mean the observance of certain rituals: praying, fasting, giving charity, and other "good" works. In Islam, however, worship is much more-it is one's entire life. As many Muslim scholars have said: "Worship is an all-inclusive term for those internal and external sayings and actions of a person that are pleasing to Allah."
In other words, worship is that which is done in obedience to Allah's will, which obviously includes rituals but goes far beyond to the realms of ones beliefs, social activities, and personal contributions to one's society and fellow human beings.
Islam looks at the individual as a whole. He is required to submit completely to Allah, as the Qur'an instructed the prophet Muhammad to do: Say (O Muhammad) my prayer, my sacrifice, my life and my death belong to Allah; He has no partner and I am ordered to be among those who submit, i.e.; Muslims. The natural result of this submission is that one's activities should conform to the instructions of the one to whom the person is submitting-Allah. Islam requires that its followers conduct every aspect of their lives according to its teachings. This might sound strange to those who view religion as a personal relation between the individual and God and as having no impact on those activities that are not connected specifically with any religious rituals.
The Prophet taught his followers that Islam is far more than a private personal matter. Islam attaches no value to rituals that are performed mechanically and have no influence on one's inner life. The Qur'an dealt with this issue when it addressed Muslims, as well as local Jews and Christians, during the dispute that arose when the prayer direction was changed from Jerusalem to the Ka'bah in Makkah:
It is not righteousness that you turn your faces toward the East or the West, but righteous is he who believes in Allah and the Last Day and the Angels and the Book and the Prophets, and gives his beloved money to the relatives and the orphans and the needy Andover the ransoming of the captives, and who observes prayer and pays the poor-due, and those who fulfill their promises when they have made one, and the patient in poverty and affliction and the steadfast in time of war; it is those who have proved truthful and it is those who are the God-fearing. (2:177)
The deeds mentioned in the above verse are indications that a person is righteous. But they are only a part of worship. Faith, according to the Prophet, is the basis of worship and "is made up of sixty and some branches: the highest of which is the belief in the Oneness of Allah, i.e., there is no God but Allah and the lowest in the scale of worship is removing obstacles and dirt from people's way"
Honest work is considered a type of worship. The Prophet said: "Whoever finds himself at the nightfall tired of his work, God will forgive his sins." Seeking knowledge is one of the highest types of worship. The Prophet told his Companions that "seeking knowledge is a (religious) duty on every Muslim." He also said: "Seeking knowledge for one hour is better than praying for seventy years. " Social courtesy and cooperation, when done for the sake of Allah, are also a part of worship: "Receiving your friend with a smile is a type of charity, helping a person to load his animal is a charity, and putting some water in your neighbor's bucket is a charity"
In Islam, the performing one's duties is also considered an act of worship. The Prophet told us that whatever one spends for his family will be counted as an acts of worship for which he will be rewarded, provided that he has acquired it through Islamically acceptable means. Kindness to family members, no matter how small, are also viewed as acts of worship. Even activities that we enjoy very much, such as sexual relations with one's spouse, are considered acts of worship as long as they are performed in accordance with the relevant Qur'anic and prophetic guidelines. For example, the Prophet once told his Companions that they would be rewarded even for engaging in sex with their wives. They were astonished and asked: "Are we to be rewarded for doing something that we enjoy very much?" The Prophet replied: "If you satisfy your desires illegally, will you be punished?" They replied, "Yes. " "So," he said, "by satisfying it legally with your wives you will be rewarded."
It is clear from the previous discussion that the concept of worship in Islam is a comprehensive concept that includes all of the positive activities engaged in by an individual. This is in agreement with the all-inclusive nature of Islam, which regulates life on the individual, social, economic, political, spiritual, and all other levels of one's life. This minute attention to one's activities is the reason why the Qur'an and the example and sayings of the Prophet deal with all aspects of an individual's and a society's life. As following these guidelines is an act of obedience to Allah, He considers them as acts of worship. This very positive attitude encourages individuals to follow the relevant guidelines and thus to bring about personal and social transformation. It also causes an individual to internalize the guidelines, for even if no one is watching him, he knows that Allah is watching him.
Discussing non-ritualistic types of worship first does not mean that the ritualistic ones have less importance. In fact, if the latter are performed correctly and sincerely, the elevate the individual both spiritually and morally and actually help him to live a righteous life according to the guidance of Allah.
Islam has several ritualistic activities that all Muslims are expected to perform. The most important one is the prayer (salah), which must be performed according to a specific style. Its importance derives from the fact that it serves as the distinctive trait of a Muslim and because it prevents a Muslim from engaging in sinful activities by putting him into direct contact with Allah five times a day. Thus, the ritual prayer is a chance for him to renew his covenant with Allah and to seek His guidance anew. As it says in the Qur'an: You alone do we worship and to You alone do we turn for help. Guide us to the straight path (1:4-.5). Actually, the ritual prayer is the first practical manifestation of the Islamic faith and is the main condition for a Muslim's success: Successful indeed are the believers who are humble in their prayers. (23:1-2)
This has also been emphasized by the Prophet, who said: "Those who offer their prayer with great care and punctuality will find it a light, a proof of their faith and a cause of their salvation on the Day of Judgment."
The second most important pillar of Islam is zakat, a term that signifies giving to the less fortunate a certain percentage of one's earnings and holdings. Giving the poor-due and performing the prayer are usually mentioned together in the Qur'an, for they are both visible manifestations of one's Islamic faith and belief that Allah is the sole owner of everything in the universe, which he allows man to enjoy as His trustee for a specific period of time: Believe in Allah and His Messenger and spend of that over which He made you trustees (57:7). In this respect, giving one's poor-due is an act of devotion that, like prayer, brings the believer nearer to his Lord.
In addition, this act provides a means to redistribute a society's wealth in a way that reduces differences between classes and groups. It makes an important contribution to social stability, for by purging the soul of the rich person from selfishness and the soul of the poor from envy and resentment against society, it blocks the channels leading to class hatred and makes it possible for the springs of brotherhood and solidarity to gush forth. Such stability is not merely based on the personal feelings of the rich: it stands on a firmly established right that, if denied by the rich, would be exacted by force, if necessary.
The month-long fast of Ramadan (siyam) is the third pillar of Islam. Its main function is to make the Muslim pure from "within," just as the external legal code (the Shari'ah) makes his external actions pure. This process of purification makes it possible for him to respond to what is true and good and to shun what is false and evil. As stated in the Qur'an: O you who believe, fasting is prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, that you may gain piety (2:183). In an authentic tradition, the Prophet reported Allah as saying: "He suspends eating, drinking, and gratification of his sexual passion for My sake. " Thus his reward is going to be according to God's great bounty.
Fasting, then, awakens an individual's conscience and gives it scope for exercise in a communal experience that is engaged in by the entire Muslim world at the same time. Such a ritual strengthens the individual's resolve to improve himself and to realize the purpose of the whole undertaking. Fasting offers a compulsory rest to the over-worked human body for the duration of one full month, and also reminds Muslims of those who are deprived of life's necessities throughout the year or throughout one's life. It makes him realize the suffering of his less fortunate Muslim brothers, a feeling that promotes in him a sense of sympathy and kindness towards Muslims and other people in general.
Lastly, we come to the annual pilgrimage to the House of Allah (the Ka'bah) in Makkah. This ritual, known as the hadj, is unique to Islam. Muslims from all comers of the world and all attired in the same clothing respond in one voice and one language with the following phrase upon entering the sacred precincts: "labbayk Allahuma Labbayk" (Here I am at your service O Lord!). This is a time of strict self-discipline and control where not only sacred things are revered, but even the life of plants and birds is made inviolable: And he that venerates the sacred things of God, it shall be better for him with his Lord (22:30) as well as And he that venerates the way marks of God, it surely is from devotion of the heart (22:32).
Pilgrimage gives an opportunity for all Muslims, regardless of their affiliations with certain groups, classes, organizations, and governments, to meet annually in a great congress. The time and venue of this congress has been set by God. All Muslims are invited to attend, for no individual or government can deny any Muslim the right to do so. Every Muslim who attends is guaranteed full safety and freedom as long as he does not violate its sanctity.
Thus, worship in Islam, whether ritual or non-ritual, trains the individual in such a way that he loves his Creator even more, which causes him to gain an unyielding will and spins to wipe out all evil and oppression from his society and to make the word of God triumphant.
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World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
Saudi Arabia
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM
Human Rights In Islam
World Assembly of Muslim Youth
Human Rights In Islam
Since God is the absolute and the sole master of men and the universe, He is the sovereign Lord, the Sustainer and Nourisher, the Merciful, Whose mercy enshrines all beings; and since He has given each man human dignity and honour, and breathed into him of His own spirit, it follows that, united in Him and through Him, and apart from their other human attributes, men are substantially the same and no tangible and actual distinction can be made among them, on account of their accidental differences such as nationality, colour or race. Every human-being is thereby related to all others and all become one community of brotherhood in their honourable and pleasant servitude to the most compassionate Lord of the Universe. In such a heavenly atmosphere the Islamic confession of the oneness of God stands dominant and central, and necessarily entails the concept of the oneness of humanity and the brotherhood of mankind.
Although an Islamic state may be set up in any part of the earth, Islam does not seek to restrict human rights or privileges to the geographical limits of its own state. Islam has laid down some universal fundamental rights for humanity as a whole, which are to he observed and respected under all circumstances whether such a person is resident within the territory of the Islamic state or outside it, whether he is at peace with the state Or at war. The Quran very clearly states:
0 believers, be you securers of justice, witness for God.
Let not detestation for a people move you not to be equitable; be equitable - that is nearer to godfearing. (5:8)
Human blood is sacred in any case and cannot be spilled without justification. And if anyone violates this sanctity of human blood by killing a soul without justification, the Quran equates it to the killing of entire mankind:
... Who so slays a soul not to retaliate for a soul slain, nor for corruption done in the land, should be as if he had slain mankind altogether.
It is not permissible to oppress women, children, old people, the sick or the wounded. Women's honour and chastity are to be respected under all circumstances. The hungry person must be fed, the naked clothed and the wounded or diseased treated medically irrespective of whether they belong to the Islamic community or are from amongst its enemies.
When we speak of human rights in Islam we really mean that these rights have been granted by God; they have not been granted by any king or by any legislative assembly. The rights granted by the kings or the legislative assemblies, can also be withdrawn in the same manner in which they are conferred. The same is the case with the rights accepted and recognised by the dictators. They can confer them when they please and withdraw them when they wish; and they can openly violate them when they like. But since in Islam human rights have been conferred by God, no legislative assembly in the world or any government on earth has the right or authority to make any amendment or change in the rights conferred by God. No one has the right to abrogate them or withdraw them. Nor are they basic human rights which are conferred on paper for the sake of show and exhibition and denied in actual life when the show is over. Nor are they like philosophical concepts which have no sanctions behind them.
The charter and the proclamations and the resolutions of the United Nations cannot be compared with the rights sanctioned by God; because the former is not applicable on anybody while the latter is applicable on every believer. They are a part and parcel of the Islamic Faith. Every Muslim or administrators who claim themselves to be Muslims, will have to accept, recognise and enforce them. If they fail to enforce them, and start denying the rights that have been guaranteed by God or make amendments and changes in them, or practically violate them while paying lip service to them, the verdict of the Holy Quran for such government is clear and unequivocal:
Those who do not judge by what God has sent down are the disbelievers. (5:44)
Human Rights in an Islamic State
1. The Security of Life and Property
In the address which the Prophet delivered on the occasion of the Farewell Hajj, he said: "Your lives and properties are forbidden to one another till you meet your Lord on the Day of Resurrection." The Prophet has also said about the dhimmis (the non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state): "One who kills a man under covenant (i.e., Dhimmi) will not even smell the fragrance of Paradise."
2. The Protection of Honour
The Holy Quran lays down:
i. You who believe, do not let one (set of) people make fun of another set.
ii. Do not defame one another.
Iii. Do not insult by using nicknames.
iv. Do not backbite or speak ill of one another. (49:11-12)
3. Sanctity and Security of Private Life
The Quran has laid down the injunction:
i. Do not spy on one another.
ii. Do not enter any houses unless you are sure of their occupant's consent.
4. The Security of Personal Freedom
Islam has laid down the principle that no citizen can be imprisoned unless his guilt has been proved in an open court. To arrest a man only on the basis of suspicion and to throw him into a prison without proper court proceedings and without providing him a reasonable opportunity to produce his defence is not permissible in Islam.
5. The Right to Protest Against Tyranny
Amongst the rights that Islam has conferred on human beings is the right to protest against government's tyranny. Referring to it the Quran says:
God does not love evil talk in public unless it is by some one who has been injured thereby.
In Islam, as has been argued earlier, all power and authority belongs to God, and with man there is only delegated power which becomes a trust; everyone who becomes a recipient or a donee of such a power has to stand in awful reverence before his people towards whom and for whose sake he will be called upon to use these powers. This was acknowledged by Hazrat Abu Bakr who said in his very first address: "Cooperate with me when I am right but correct me when I commit error; obey me so long as I follow the commandments of Allah and His prophet; but turn away from me when I deviate."
6. Freedom of Expression
Islam gives the right of freedom of thought and expression to all citizens of the Islamic state on the condition that it should be used for the propagation of virtue and truth and not for spreading evil and wickedness. The Islamic concept of freedom of expression is much superior to the concept prevalent in the West. Under no circumstances would Islam allow evil and wickedness to be propagated. It also does not give anybody the right to use abusive or offensive language in the name of criticism. It was the practice of the Muslims to enquire from the Holy Prophet whether on a certain matter a divine injunction had been revealed to him. If he said that he had received no divine injunction, the Muslims freely expressed their opinion on the matter.
7. Freedom of Association
Islam has also given people the right to freedom of association and formation of parties or organisations. This right is also subject to certain general rules.
8. Freedom of Conscience and Conviction
Islam has laid down the injunction: There should be no coercion in the matter of faith.
On the contrary totalitarian societies, totally deprive the individuals of their freedom. Indeed this undue exaltation of the state authority curiously enough postulates a sort of servitude, of slavishness on the part of man. At one time by slavery was meant total control of man over man - now that type of slavery has been legally abolished but in its place totalitarian societies impose a similar sort of control over individuals.
9. Protection of Religious Sentiments
Along with the freedom of conviction and freedom of conscience Islam has given the right to the individual that his religious sentiments will be given due respect and nothing will be said or done which may encroach upon his right.
10. Protection from Arbitrary Imprisonment
Islam also recognises the right of the individual that he will not be arrested or imprisoned for the offences of others. The Holy Quran has laid down this principle clearly:
No bearer of burdens shall be made to bear the burden of another.
11. The Right to Basic Necessities of Life
Islam has recognised the right of the needy people that help and assistance will be provided to them: And in their wealth there is acknowledged right for the needy and the destitute.
12. Equality Before Law
Islam gives its citizens the right to absolute and complete equality in the eyes of the law.
13. Rulers Not Above the Law
A woman belonging to a high and noble family was arrested in connection with theft. The case was brought to the Prophet, and it was recommended that she might be spared the punishment of theft. The Prophet replied. "The nations that lived before you were destroyed by God because they punished the common-man for their offences and let their dignitaries go unpunished for their crimes; I swear by Him Who holds my life in His hand that even if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad, had committed this crime, I would have cut her hand."
14. The Right to Participate in the Affairs of State
And their business is (conducted) through consultation among themselves. (42:38)
The shura or the legislative assembly has no other meaning except that: The executive head of the government and the members of the assembly should be elected by free and independent choice of the people.
Lastly, it is to be made clear that Islam tries to achieve the above-mentioned human rights and many others not only by providing certain legal safeguards but mainly by inviting mankind to transcend the lower level of animal life to be able to go beyond the mere ties fostered by the kinship of blood, racial superiority, linguistic arrogance, and economic privileges. It invites mankind to move on to a plane of existence where, by reason of his inner excellence, man can realise the ideal of the Brotherhood of man.
-
WAMY SERIES ON ISLAM NO. 10
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
Saudi Arabia
World Assembly of Muslim Youth
Human Rights In Islam
Since God is the absolute and the sole master of men and the universe, He is the sovereign Lord, the Sustainer and Nourisher, the Merciful, Whose mercy enshrines all beings; and since He has given each man human dignity and honour, and breathed into him of His own spirit, it follows that, united in Him and through Him, and apart from their other human attributes, men are substantially the same and no tangible and actual distinction can be made among them, on account of their accidental differences such as nationality, colour or race. Every human-being is thereby related to all others and all become one community of brotherhood in their honourable and pleasant servitude to the most compassionate Lord of the Universe. In such a heavenly atmosphere the Islamic confession of the oneness of God stands dominant and central, and necessarily entails the concept of the oneness of humanity and the brotherhood of mankind.
Although an Islamic state may be set up in any part of the earth, Islam does not seek to restrict human rights or privileges to the geographical limits of its own state. Islam has laid down some universal fundamental rights for humanity as a whole, which are to he observed and respected under all circumstances whether such a person is resident within the territory of the Islamic state or outside it, whether he is at peace with the state Or at war. The Quran very clearly states:
0 believers, be you securers of justice, witness for God.
Let not detestation for a people move you not to be equitable; be equitable - that is nearer to godfearing. (5:8)
Human blood is sacred in any case and cannot be spilled without justification. And if anyone violates this sanctity of human blood by killing a soul without justification, the Quran equates it to the killing of entire mankind:
... Who so slays a soul not to retaliate for a soul slain, nor for corruption done in the land, should be as if he had slain mankind altogether.
It is not permissible to oppress women, children, old people, the sick or the wounded. Women's honour and chastity are to be respected under all circumstances. The hungry person must be fed, the naked clothed and the wounded or diseased treated medically irrespective of whether they belong to the Islamic community or are from amongst its enemies.
When we speak of human rights in Islam we really mean that these rights have been granted by God; they have not been granted by any king or by any legislative assembly. The rights granted by the kings or the legislative assemblies, can also be withdrawn in the same manner in which they are conferred. The same is the case with the rights accepted and recognised by the dictators. They can confer them when they please and withdraw them when they wish; and they can openly violate them when they like. But since in Islam human rights have been conferred by God, no legislative assembly in the world or any government on earth has the right or authority to make any amendment or change in the rights conferred by God. No one has the right to abrogate them or withdraw them. Nor are they basic human rights which are conferred on paper for the sake of show and exhibition and denied in actual life when the show is over. Nor are they like philosophical concepts which have no sanctions behind them.
The charter and the proclamations and the resolutions of the United Nations cannot be compared with the rights sanctioned by God; because the former is not applicable on anybody while the latter is applicable on every believer. They are a part and parcel of the Islamic Faith. Every Muslim or administrators who claim themselves to be Muslims, will have to accept, recognise and enforce them. If they fail to enforce them, and start denying the rights that have been guaranteed by God or make amendments and changes in them, or practically violate them while paying lip service to them, the verdict of the Holy Quran for such government is clear and unequivocal:
Those who do not judge by what God has sent down are the disbelievers. (5:44)
Human Rights in an Islamic State
1. The Security of Life and Property
In the address which the Prophet delivered on the occasion of the Farewell Hajj, he said: "Your lives and properties are forbidden to one another till you meet your Lord on the Day of Resurrection." The Prophet has also said about the dhimmis (the non-Muslim citizens of the Muslim state): "One who kills a man under covenant (i.e., Dhimmi) will not even smell the fragrance of Paradise."
2. The Protection of Honour
The Holy Quran lays down:
i. You who believe, do not let one (set of) people make fun of another set.
ii. Do not defame one another.
Iii. Do not insult by using nicknames.
iv. Do not backbite or speak ill of one another. (49:11-12)
3. Sanctity and Security of Private Life
The Quran has laid down the injunction:
i. Do not spy on one another.
ii. Do not enter any houses unless you are sure of their occupant's consent.
4. The Security of Personal Freedom
Islam has laid down the principle that no citizen can be imprisoned unless his guilt has been proved in an open court. To arrest a man only on the basis of suspicion and to throw him into a prison without proper court proceedings and without providing him a reasonable opportunity to produce his defence is not permissible in Islam.
5. The Right to Protest Against Tyranny
Amongst the rights that Islam has conferred on human beings is the right to protest against government's tyranny. Referring to it the Quran says:
God does not love evil talk in public unless it is by some one who has been injured thereby.
In Islam, as has been argued earlier, all power and authority belongs to God, and with man there is only delegated power which becomes a trust; everyone who becomes a recipient or a donee of such a power has to stand in awful reverence before his people towards whom and for whose sake he will be called upon to use these powers. This was acknowledged by Hazrat Abu Bakr who said in his very first address: "Cooperate with me when I am right but correct me when I commit error; obey me so long as I follow the commandments of Allah and His prophet; but turn away from me when I deviate."
6. Freedom of Expression
Islam gives the right of freedom of thought and expression to all citizens of the Islamic state on the condition that it should be used for the propagation of virtue and truth and not for spreading evil and wickedness. The Islamic concept of freedom of expression is much superior to the concept prevalent in the West. Under no circumstances would Islam allow evil and wickedness to be propagated. It also does not give anybody the right to use abusive or offensive language in the name of criticism. It was the practice of the Muslims to enquire from the Holy Prophet whether on a certain matter a divine injunction had been revealed to him. If he said that he had received no divine injunction, the Muslims freely expressed their opinion on the matter.
7. Freedom of Association
Islam has also given people the right to freedom of association and formation of parties or organisations. This right is also subject to certain general rules.
8. Freedom of Conscience and Conviction
Islam has laid down the injunction: There should be no coercion in the matter of faith.
On the contrary totalitarian societies, totally deprive the individuals of their freedom. Indeed this undue exaltation of the state authority curiously enough postulates a sort of servitude, of slavishness on the part of man. At one time by slavery was meant total control of man over man - now that type of slavery has been legally abolished but in its place totalitarian societies impose a similar sort of control over individuals.
9. Protection of Religious Sentiments
Along with the freedom of conviction and freedom of conscience Islam has given the right to the individual that his religious sentiments will be given due respect and nothing will be said or done which may encroach upon his right.
10. Protection from Arbitrary Imprisonment
Islam also recognises the right of the individual that he will not be arrested or imprisoned for the offences of others. The Holy Quran has laid down this principle clearly:
No bearer of burdens shall be made to bear the burden of another.
11. The Right to Basic Necessities of Life
Islam has recognised the right of the needy people that help and assistance will be provided to them: And in their wealth there is acknowledged right for the needy and the destitute.
12. Equality Before Law
Islam gives its citizens the right to absolute and complete equality in the eyes of the law.
13. Rulers Not Above the Law
A woman belonging to a high and noble family was arrested in connection with theft. The case was brought to the Prophet, and it was recommended that she might be spared the punishment of theft. The Prophet replied. "The nations that lived before you were destroyed by God because they punished the common-man for their offences and let their dignitaries go unpunished for their crimes; I swear by Him Who holds my life in His hand that even if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad, had committed this crime, I would have cut her hand."
14. The Right to Participate in the Affairs of State
And their business is (conducted) through consultation among themselves. (42:38)
The shura or the legislative assembly has no other meaning except that: The executive head of the government and the members of the assembly should be elected by free and independent choice of the people.
Lastly, it is to be made clear that Islam tries to achieve the above-mentioned human rights and many others not only by providing certain legal safeguards but mainly by inviting mankind to transcend the lower level of animal life to be able to go beyond the mere ties fostered by the kinship of blood, racial superiority, linguistic arrogance, and economic privileges. It invites mankind to move on to a plane of existence where, by reason of his inner excellence, man can realise the ideal of the Brotherhood of man.
-
WAMY SERIES ON ISLAM NO. 10
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
Saudi Arabia
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