By Poyan Taherloo - November 2006
As society is a social cooperation with the purpose of advancing the welfare of the participants, there will always exist both conflicts and common interests. There will be common interests because the social cooperation creates basis for mutual benefits, and there will be conflicts in regard to the distribution of the profit, that is just achieved from the cooperation.
Therefor there is need for principles of justice, that are principles for how rights and duties are distributed in accordance to the basic institutions of society and for a fair distribution of advantages and disadvantages in relation to the social cooperation (Rawls 2005: 32).
As such Rawls argues that the primary subject of justice is the fundamental structures of society, that reflect how the most important social institutions distribute basic rights and obligations, and determine the distribution of advantages and disadvantages of the social cooperation. Among the most important social institutions are the political constitution and central social and economic arrangements, as for example the legal protection of the freedom of thought and conscience, macro economy, private property law and the monogamous family. These fundamental structures are the primary subject of justice as their effects are so fundamental and make themselves evident from beginning of life (Rawls 2005: 34 ff.).
A well-organized society is characterized by that everyone deliberately recognizes the same principles of justice, and where the fundamental institutions accommodate and fulfill these principles (Rawls 2005: 32).
Rawls’ theory transcends the limitations of the logic positivism, as the statement on justice, besides an empirical reference, at the same time is referred to normative principles. Rawls finds this as possible because the normative principles are derived on basis of model for normative reasoning, which we all would actually accept (Midtgaard 2005: 16; Rawls 2005: 46).
The basis for Rawls’ formulation of this model for normative argumentation is contract theory, as it is found with Locke, Rousseau and Kant, which Rawls applies in a more abstract form. A contract theory is structured in two steps, as there in the first step is determined an original position, that constitute the framework for the participants following choices. The participants in the original position have the opportunity to stay in this position or move away from it by entering into binding agreements. The decision the participants make is step two (Midtgaard 2005: 18)
In Rawls’ theory the original position is defined as a strictly hypothetical situation, that is expected to lead to certain perception of justice; where justice is the fulfillment of those principles that free and rational individuals, that care for their own preferences, would choose as the fundamental conditions for their social cooperation.
The most pivotal characteristic of the original position, that Rawls formulates, is that no one knows their situation in society, including their economic and social situation, like no one knows their innate abilities as intelligence, strength and the like, together with their perception of right and wrong and phycological dispositions. This original position is an expression of a ’veil of ignorance’. A such position ensure that everyone is set equally in their choice of principles, so that no one can choose principles based on what favorize their own situation. Thus the principles of justice become a result of a fair agreement, why Rawls uses the expression ‘justice as fairness’, because the principles are just agreed upon in a position that is fair (Rawls 2005: 39).
The purpose of the conditions that are present in the original position, is clearly to express the equality between humans ‘as moral persons with a perception of their own preferences and sense of justice’. The purpose is moreover to exclude those principles, that only can be expected to be accepted if one knows their situation in society; which is irrelevant in relation to justice, as they morally considered appear to be arbitrary (Rawls 2005: 45).
Based on these conditions for the original position, the model furthermore represents an instrument for, in a systematic and impartial manner, to reflect on the justice of the institutions that we live by and that in a decisive way effect our opinions and preferences. The original position constitutes the morally seen best condition for reflecting on to which extend the institutions of our society are just, and if they impact us in such a way, that we can find acceptable.
Rawls believes that this is a morally seen necessary abstraction, as the institutions and the corresponding attitudes and values possibly, and may be most definitely, include many injustices. If we consider the justice of the institutions within the boundaries of these institutions, without the abstraction, that is possible by the original position, we would only reproduce the injustices (Midtgaard 2005: 21).
Rawls believes that it based on this model is possible to reach those principles of justice, that can be accepted as foundation for the fundamental structures of society in the start position. But the chosen principles should so to say pass yet another test, for them to be accepted as indicators of justice. Here the principles should be held up against our deliberate and strongest believes of justice, to assess if there is consistence. It is our intuition, that is described as our strongest believes regarding justice, that constitute temporary reference point for, what we assume any of the chosen principles must be consistent with (Rawls 2005: 46).
If a principle does not consist with our intuition, we have the choice between revising this principle or revising our intuition. It is a question about how ‘strong’ or ‘uncompromising’ our intuition is in regard to a given principle. In case that we have very strong moral intuitions about that for example slavery, torture and discrimination are not just, we cannot imagine principles that conflict these intuitions. In other cases we may revise our intuitions in relation to our assessment of the principles, because the intuitions are more ambiguous.
By moving ‘forth and back’ between principles in the start position and our intuitions, where it sometimes is intuitions that are revised and other times are principles that are revised, we reach a point where there is consistency between principles and intuitions. Rawls describes this state as a ‘reflective equilibrium’, where we have reached a perception of the start position, or a perception of justice. This equilibrium is not necessarily stable, and can continuously be disturbed by conditions that should be added the foundation for the selection of principles, which again can result in a revision of principles and intuitions (Rawls 2005: 46).
Rawls furthermore points out that this equilibrium is not an expression of that there can be a state wherefrom it is possible in itself to refer to anything obvious about some principles or intuitions. On the contrary a perception of justice should be perceived as many considerations’ mutual support, and where considerations are consistent in a coherent standpoint (Rawls 2005: 47).
In regard to the prioritizing of the chosen principles in relation to each other, Rawls describes two possible methods. The question regarding priority can be addressed with help from an all-encompassing principle or with help from more principles set up in a serial or lexical order* (Rawls 2005: 65).
Rawls has a declared ambition to elaborate a theory of justice that can constitute an alternative to the utilitarianism, that dominates English language ethic and political philosophy. To that purpose he applies the form of utilitarianism that is expressed by Sidgwicks, that he finds as the clearest and most accessible, which he considers critically in the light of his own theory.
The pivot of this theory is that society is just and thus well-organized, when its most important institutions are arranged so, that it results in the greatest sum of satisfaction, calculated for all the individuals that belong to that society. It is an expression of the principle of chose for the single individual, given as a desire for self-interested utility maximization, which is extended so that it is applied to the union of individuals or the entire society (Rawls 2005: 48 ff.).
It is in this most simple way, by which teleological theories link together the two ethical concepts of the good and the right: ‘the good is defined independent of the right, where after the right is defined as that which maximizes the good’ (Rawls 2005: 50).
Rawls expresses his understanding for why utilitarianism can seem so straight forward, obvious and almost sufficient, and lets it be an open question whether the principle of utility would be chosen as principle of justice in the start position, but at the same time he levels a great deal of critique against this theory.
As a start Rawls does not find it probable that individuals that consider each other as equals and with equal rights to stipulate mutual demands, would reach an agreement on a principle, that will result in worse conditions for some, if only others can enjoy greater sum of benefits.
_________________
* An order that requires the fulfillment of previous principles in this order, before a given principle is considered.
Rawls expresses it among other things as such:
“In the absence of strong and lasting benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests. Thus it seems that the principle of utility is incompatible with the conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage.”
(Rawls 1999: 13)
Rawls believes that persons in the start position would choose two principles that although very different both exclude the principle of utility. The first principle demands equality in distribution of fundamental rights and duties, and the other principle demands that social and economic inequalities result in compensated benefits for all, including particularly the most disadvantaged in society (Rawls 2005: 41).
Another substantial critique that Rawls levels against the utilitarianism, originate from the fact that this theory does not question what that is chosen as the good, and which it is right to maximize. It is crucial to obtain the greatest sum of satisfaction, and an assessment of the source of this satisfaction and the quality is not significant. The principles of justice regarding natural law, as an example in form of freedom, prohibition of discrimination and differential treatment, are therefor only recognized as far as these result in greatest satisfaction in society, and can thus also be restricted as far as that would result in greater satisfaction. In justice as fairness the individuals accept the principles of equal liberty for all in the original position, and this cannot be changed. An individual can therefore not claim satisfaction that happens at the cost of others’ liberty, and thereby the original position also puts limitations on what that is reasonable to perceive as self interest (Rawls 2005: 55).
Rawls for one expresses this as such:
“Thus while the contract doctrine accepts our convictions about the priority of justice as on the whole sound, utilitarianism seeks to account for them as a socially useful illusion.”
(Rawls: 25)
It is very difficult to overlook, that Immanuel Kant has been a central source of inspiration for Rawls. This is first and foremost expressed by Rawls’ formulation of the original position and ‘the veil of ignorance’. The core in Kants moral philosophy is his formulation of a universal moral law, the categorical imperative: ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law’. This calls for our abstraction from egoistic inclinations and recognizes other individuals’ equality with our selves (Nerheim 1986: 156).
Kant moreover formulates: ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end’. This is an expression of the respect for the human, and the ideal society, as Kant defines as 'The Kingdom of Ends', where all humans to an equal degree have their liberty accommodated (Grøn 2005: 232). It concerns in other words to put oneself in others’ place and think about a hypothetic others situation, based on humans as free and equal.
What the core of Rawls’ theory of justice contribute to regarding the above, is a tool by which we have the best conditions for putting ourselves in others’ place, namely a hypothetical original position, characterized by the ‘veil of ignorance’.
Kants distinction between theoretical reason, world of the phenomena, and the practical reason, humans’ moral will, is expressed in Rawls’ theory, regarding the substantiation of the selection of principles in the original position. We see this distinction in, that we on the one hand are deeply socially determined and impacted by the institutions that we live by, as parallel to the world of the phenomena where we do not have any liberty. On the other hand we have our intuitions that allow us to reflect on the justice of the institutions that we live by, which correspond to our practical reason with Kant (Midtgaard 2005: 21 ff.; Nerheim 1986: 142).
Moreover there is a number of similarities between Kant and Rawls in their basic theory of science, as for an example that the individual is perceived as autonomous while the social space is considered as arbitrary. Both theories are deontological - build on ethics of duty - and strive for certain universal laws (Notes from lecture).
Both theories, Kants formulation of the categorical imperative as well as Rawls’ formulation of justice as fairness, are a delight for the belief that there are ways for humans to live together in balance with themselves and their surroundings. But the theories however do not seem to correspond with direction for coexistence that reflect our age; whether it is because too many are unable to put themselves in the hypothetical others place, and act accordingly, or that justice as fairness as described by Kant and Rawls does not appeal to us. In 1996 it appeared in UN’s report on development that the worlds' 358 wealthiest single persons had an accumulated fortune that matches 2.5 billion of the worlds' poorest. It is hard to imagine that the development in this relation, to current day, should have changes significantly in benefit of the poor. (Taylor 2000: 2)
Even though there are conditions that contradict our strongest moral intuitions, it seems like the institutional and historic circumstance, prevent many from accepting and trying to implement principles of justice selected in the original position, to much further than the borders of EU, Denmark and maybe even their own front door. Thus it seems to reflect that we are historic individuals that to a crucial degree are impacted by our surroundings, why it can prove difficult to materialize justice as fairness.
There are thus many examples of principles that contradict our strong moral intuitions, as for example liberty and equality, that never less drowned in human apathy, by those who possess the most resources in the world. A situation that will change because it, with formulations of justice, as with Kant and Rawls, is possible to appeal to the human sense of justice, and not least because the consequences of unjust conditions in the world become increasingly more evident.
Litterateur
Grøn, Arne; Husted, Jørgen; Lübcke, Poul; Rasmussen, Stig Alstrup; Sandøe, Peter; and Stefansen, Niels Christian, 2005: ’Politikkens filosofiske leksikon’, Politikkens Forlag, Copenhagen
Midtgaard, Sørenn Flinch, 2005: ’John Rawls’, Roskilde Universitetsforlag, Roskilde
Nerheim, Hjördis and Rossvær, Vigo, 1986: ‘Filosofiens historie fra Sokrates til Wittgenstein’, Politikkens Forlag, Copenhagen
Rawls, John, 2005: ’En teori on retfærdighed’, translated by Mogens Chrom Jacobsen from ‘A theory of justice. Revised Edition’, 1971, Det lille forlag, Frederiksberg
Rawls, John, 1999: A revised edition of ‘A Theory of Justice’, published in 1971 by Harvard University Press
Taylor, Peter J. and Flint, Colin, 2000: ‘Political geography – world economy, nation-state and locality’, Pearson Education, Essex, England
