By Poyan Taherloo - November 2005
The liberal tradition in International politics originates from the time around the emergence of the modern liberal states. Liberal philosophers as Locke, Bentham and Kant, saw a great potential for human progress, in civil society and capitalist economy, which could be achieved if the state could ensure the liberty of the individual. The liberal tradition is thus based on the basic assumption regarding an optimistic view of humanity, a linear conception of history and a perception of the state that should be guarantor of the liberty of the individual.
The liberal theory is based on an optimistic view of humanity, where the rational ‘self-interest maximizing’ human is perceived, as being capable of realizing the many common interests, between humans, and the great benefits that can be achieved by cooperation, both nationally and internationally.
Against the backdrop of an optimistic view of humanity, the liberal theory is based on a linear conception of history, where humans are capable of learning from the mistakes of the past, and where the historically accumulated knowledge, constitutes the foundation for lasting progress towards prosperity and cooperation.
In order to succeed in achieving these human progresses, it is necessary that the state upholds law and order, and ensures the liberty and property of the individual.
Based on these assumptions, liberalists argue for, that the human progress, particularly in relation to the modernization processes, will result in increased international cooperation and peace (Jackson and Sorensen 2003:106-108).
Liberal peace
The thesis about ‘liberal peace’ is in many ways very pivotal in the liberal tradition, and derive originally from Immanuel Kant, who in his book ‘Perpetual Peace’, from 1795 set up some preconditions for international peace. It can be derived from Kants original text that international peace depends on the proliferation of democratic governance, economic interdependence together with international law and international organizations (Oneal and Russett 2003:267).
There are hereof three hypotheses, that are each emphasized particularly as part of different schools of liberal theory, but the proliferation of democratic governance is particularly important, why the thesis is also defined as ‘democratic peace’. This is because the individual liberty, as in democratic states, is just the precondition for utilizing the human potential. The first hypotheses is that democracies are more reluctant to use force, particularly against other democracies, than non-democracies, which is pivotal, in Republican liberalism. The second hypotheses is, that economic interdependence constitutes an important incentive for, maintaining peaceful relations between democracies, which is pivotal in Interdependence liberalism. Finally there is a hypotheses about that international organizations influence democracies to avoid war, which is pivotal in Institutional liberalism (Oneal and Russett 2003: 273; Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 112 ff.).
In the thesis regarding liberal peace the three factors, that have significance for peace, are not isolated from each other, but reinforce each other mutually. International relations can for an example develop into peaceful interaction, through mutually beneficial economic trade, ensured by international law, and controlled by - and negotiated in international organizations (Oneal and Russett 2003: 281).
Theoretical argumentation
There are two overall explanations for that democracies are less inclined to wage war against each other. The one explanation is that democratic countries, usually resolve national conflict peacefully through dialog and negotiation, without resorting to threats and violence, and because democracies are aware that other democracies have same norms, they would apply this practice in relation to each other. This is due to not least a respect for the common democratic norms and values, why it will be normal with negotiation and compromise, and unacceptable to use threats and force.
The other reason is that democratic leaders are held accountable for their decisions, that are continuously evaluated in open democratic institutions. Because the expense of war is high, and in the end can cost democratic leaders their power, they are less inclined to wage war. Authoritarian leaders in contrast are not held accountable in the same way, as they can stay in power, by oppressing their populations (Oneal and Russet 2003: 274).
There are accordingly two overall explanations for that increased economic interdependence between democracies reduce the probability for war, between these. The one explanation is that increased trade between states, at the same time result in an increased communication between these, that also reaches beyond a specifically trades related communication, which form a basis for mutual understanding, recognition and cooperation.
The other explanation is that peace between states is crucial for inter-state trade, why increased trade between states means, that there will be greater political opposition to initiating a war, and thereby loosing the economic gain in mutual trade (Oneal and Russet 2003: 275).
There are many explanations to that international organizations effect the behavior of states, so that they are less inclined to wage war. Some of the overall are that international organizations reduce insecurity by providing the member states with information and forums for cooperation and dialog, function as mediator in conflicts between states, influence state norms, clarify common interests and constitute common reference for the states (Oneal and Russett 2003: 276).
Empirical argumentation
One of the studies that confirm the thesis regarding liberal peace, is a statistical analysis of the behavior of states in regard to each other in the period 1885-1992. In this study all states have been set up across each other in pairs, which has given more than 230.000 cases, where a case is the relations between two states in a certain year. Furthermore every state, each year in this period has been placed on a scale over how democratic this state is assessed to be, how much economic interdependence there has been between the state in question and each of the other states, together with how many international organizations the concerned state is member of, that the other state is also member of.
In assessment of the degree of democracy the study has looked at, the presence of institutions and procedures, through which the citizens have the opportunity to express their preferences about alternative politicians and leaders, institutionalized limits on the use of force by the state, together with guaranties for the liberty of the citizens in their everyday and in political participation (Oneal and Russett 2003: 272).
In assessment of the degree of interdependence the study has for each case put together the one country’s’ import and export in relation to the other country, and divided this number with the BNP of the country. In this way the study has reached a number for how much of a certain country’s BNP that consists in trade with the other country in a given case, and thereby the degree of interdependence (Oneal and Russet 2003: 275).
Finally the study has assessed the degree of membership of international organizations, on how many international organizations, which both states in a certain case are members of (Oneal and Russet 2003: 276).
On these grounds the study has calculated the probability of military conflict in a certain case, with a certain place in regard to the three variables, democracy, interdependence and membership of international organizations, and held this probability up against another case, with a different place in regard to these variables. In this way it has been possible to derive the three variable’s influence on the probability of a military conflict between states (Oneal and Russet 2003: 271).
It is important to underline, that the study can identify and demonstrate a connection between variation in the three variables and the probability of conflict between states, but that it is for the theory to explain the specific causal relation (Oneal and Russet 2003: 277).
The result of the statistical analysis shows a clear connection between the three variables and the probability of conflict. This connection is demonstrated by keeping two of the three variables constant, while comparing a case where the last variable is at 90th percentile, with a case where the same variable is at 10th percentile.
The analysis shows that if the least democratic state in a case is located at 90th percentile (near the most democratic end), instead of an authoritarian 10th percentile, the probability of military conflict, is 86 % less. The analysis shows that military conflict between very democratic states are very rare, while conflicts between authoritarian states are much more probable.
Conflicts are furthermore probable in cases with a very democratic state and a very authoritarian state.
The effect of economic interdependence on the probability of military conflict, is not so evident, as with democracy, but the connection can be demonstrated. If the least interdependent of the states in a case is at 90th percentile, the probability of military conflict is reduced with approximately one third, compared to if it was at 10th percentile.
The effect of common membership of an international organization in a certain case, on the probability of conflict, is also very clear. An increase in common membership of international organizations to 90th percentile, reduces the probability of conflict with approximately 40 %.
If all three variables are assessed together, that is the degree of democracy, economic interdependence and common membership of international organizations, are increased to 90th percentile, for the lowest located state in a case, it reduces the probability of military conflict by 95 % (Oneal and Russet 2003: 278).
The reasons of realism against liberal peace theory
Much of the critique of the liberal tradition, originates from the realism tradition. Based on a ‘pessimistic’ view of humanity, realism build on a cyclical perception of history, where ‘history is the same damn thing over again’. The first priority of the states is still to survive, interaction still happens within a state system where anarchy rules, and self-help is still crucial, as no other looks out for the state in such a system, besides the state itself. The states therefor rearm in an attempt to be able to defend themselves, which is perceived as a threat by other states, which also rearm. A situation that in the end results in war between states (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 125).
The common thread in the realism critique of liberal theory, and the thesis of liberal peace, is that there despite great changes in the interaction patterns of states, which realism recognizes, still exists a state system of anarchy, that will continue to exist, and that implies insecurity for the states (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 127).
The argumentation of the realism against republican liberalism is that peace between democracies always can change to war between these, and that ‘today’s friends very well can end up being enemies tomorrow’. Besides there are no guaranties that states will continue to be democracies, and that they will not change into authoritarian states or other forms of non-democracies (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 126).
This argumentation seems as an attempt to underline, that realism still can have greater influence again. Because it is clear, that there is a probability that democracies can wage war against each other, which the thesis of liberal peace does not exclude, and that democracies can get to be non-democracies. But with the proliferation of democracy, and an extensive cooperation between democracies, this probability is severely reduced. There are also examples of democracies, where it would be unimaginable with a return to an authoritarian system, partly because democracy is deeply institutionalized and enjoy very great support among the population, and partly because it would endanger the state’s good relations with other democracies. It is thus unimaginable, that for an example an EU-country would go back to an authoritarian system, and therefor the historic development in these countries are irreversible, on these areas. In the same way the probability of war between these states is extremely small, simply because the cost would be vital, not least because of the very extensive cooperation.
The realism argumentation against Interdependence liberalism is that economic interdependence is not something new, and that this interdependence has not previously been able to prevent war. The share of export of the world’s PNP was less in 1970 than in the years from 1880-1910. The great increase in world trade in the period 1950-1970, which liberalists perceive as sign of greater interdependence, is nothing more than an increase from an unusually low level, due to the two world wars and The great depression, in the first half of the 20th century (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 125).
It is very possible that economic interdependence is not a new phenomenon, but the social - and technological development, not least in the last half of the 20th century, have great significance for how economic interdependence effects the probability of war. Today there is a greater awareness amongst the population regarding the economic interdependence, and which effect it has for the prosperity. Therefor it must be expected that political decisions, that jeopardize inter-state trade, are assessed by the population on different grounds than before.
Furthermore there are many democratic countries, particularly in western Europe, where the population today enjoy a level of prosperity, that has not been the case previously, and which the population is unwilling to jeopardize. What one does not have, one cannot lose, but what one has got use to is difficult to do without, and if this can be avoided, it would be best.
So it may be right that the economic interdependence is not something new, but the development in the political-, social-, and technological areas gives this interdependence an entirely different significance that previously.
The realism also argues against the significance that Liberal institutionalism attribute international organizations. Despite that states cooperate in international organizations, these organizations by themselves do not have any significance. International organizations merely constitute a power based interaction between states, where the strongest wins. Without a supranational power monopoly, the international organizations do not change the fact, that the state system is an anarchy, and that states are self-sustained (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 129).
The question is how much order there nevertheless is in the anarchy, and how much international organizations can influence self-sustained states, without the presence of a supranational power monopoly. Within the social sciences today there are a great approval of that ‘institutions matter’, and that institutions effect the rationales and preferences of the members.
There are many examples of collectively determined common norms, values and strategies, that set limitations on the state’s possibilities, independent of their power position, not least in regard to the EU and WTO. It can not be contradicted that the power position of the states, also have a very great significance within international organizations. But the single state’s power position through international organizations, face the accumulated power that states have together in a common cause, why there comes about a form of order in the system, that despite the absence of a supranational power monopoly, can resemble the national democratic system.
Finally there exist a realist argumentation against the causal logic, that the thesis of liberal peace is based on, namely that democratic governance reduces the probability of war, and thereby effects the international system. Realists argue that the opposite is the case, so that the conditions of the international system’s structure, that determine the external conditions of the states, also have crucial influence on the configuration of the national systems of the states. It is argued that the greater an external threat the state encounters, or finds as encountering, the greater extent the foreign policy of the state will be determined on ‘authoritarian’ grounds, and the more centralized the structure of the political system will be (Layne1994: 45).
But the explanation of the realism is not possible to falsify, because explanations for a state becoming less democratic, always can be found. If there are no evidence of a specific external threat, the less democracy can be explained, by that the state was convinced about, the existence of a threat. It is also questionable how much democracy is ‘disturbed’ in case of an external threat. There are many examples of democratic countries, that despite external threats, still determine their foreign policy on completely democratic premises, under unchanged circumstances, and in open democratic institutions. For an example United States and other western European countries during the cold war; US, Denmark and Great Britain that are currently at war, and not least Israel.
Literature
Jackson, Robert and Sorensen, Georg: ‘International relations, theories and approaches’, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003
Layne, Christopher: ‘Kant or Cant, the myth of democratic peace’, International Security, page 5-49, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994
Oneal, John R and Russett, Bruce: ‘Finding peace in a world of hegemony and terrorism’, Oxford University Press and Japan Association of International Relations, 2003
