By Poyan Taherloo - April 2007
Critique consists of the human activity of passing judgments, that are substantiated with reference to one or more standards. Critique is often associated with the modern or the enlightenment, where humans set up standards, without being subjected the traditional authorities. This human emancipation process, also conditioned by the historic development of reason together with the establishment of a knowledge autonomy and authority, necessitates critique, as humans define the conditions for legitimate reasons, in order to determine what that can be known, what that can be done and what that can be hoped for. (Foucault: 28)
Critique of social conditions that can generally be defined as social critique, can be classified according to different ideal types of critique forms. It is possible to distinguish between these critique forms, as they refer to different standards in substantiation of their critique (Compendium: 1). There can be distinguished between 6 ideal types of critique*, and in the following are further explained critique as definition of social pathologies, based on Axel Honneth, together with moral philosophically substantiated critique, based on Nancy Fraser. These critique forms and their societal function and meaning are then discussed, with inclusion of a theory of justice by Reinar Forst, that can be characterized as foundation for a moral philosophical critique.
In critique as definition of social pathologies the task consists in identifying development tendencies in society, that can be judged as maldevelopments or even as social pathologies, with or without direct reference to standards. It is thus the task for this critique, to diagnose such pathologies and assign an appropriate cure. (Compendium: 1)
In an attempt to specify the task of the social philosophy in ‘Pathologies of the social: The past and present of social philosophy’, Axel Honneth points out that the discipline depends on its ability to, in a convincing manner, substantiate ethical judgments concerning necessary preconditions for human life (Honneth: 393).
If the discipline wants to criticize those development processes that can be characterized as maldevelopments or sick, it is thus crucial which standards that are formulated for assessment of these development processes, and with that which development processes that can be assessed as healthy. The precondition for assessing something as wrong or sick, is in other words a credible definition of what that is right or healthy. (Honneth: 387)
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* The technocratic scientistic critique, the pragmatic critique, critique of actual contradistinctions, the immanent critique, critique as defining social pathologies and the moral philosophically substantiated critique (Compendium: 1 ff.)
Based on a study of contemporary diagnoses produced by philosophers and sociologists as among others Rousseau and Hobbes together with Hegel, Marx, Horkheimer, Adorno, Arendt and Foucault, Honneth derives that common for them is that they in each particular way fundamentally are convinced that a social activity that constitute the very basic preconditions for human life, is threatened by an accelerating proliferation of industrialization (Honneth: 391).
Honneth points to contemporary diagnose by Rousseaus, of the social life as alienated in relation to the initial human existence, as the first time that social lifeforms, besides their political moral legitimacy, are examined in regard to the structural conditions they impose an aim of human self-realization (Honneth: 375).
From Simmel, Tönnis and Weber to Dürkheim, Honneth points out, that they all were concerned with the historical process that together with the establishment of a new economic order in their age, had resulted in a moral starvation of the social life (Honneth: 381).
With Marx this is expressed in, his attempts to identify the preconditions for capitalism that lead to a social alienation. It concerns the preconditions for capitalism, that constitute barriers for a process of human self-determined work, as Marx believes is a condition for human self-realization (Honneth: 337).
With Arendt it is expressed in her thesis about, the progressing industrialization which means that the technical form of activity and work archives a social dominance, which is so powerful that it threatens completely to suppress the emancipatory practice in public discussion and communication (Honneth: 384).
Based on this study of diagnoses, of which some are mentioned above, Honneth formulates a definition of the normal or healthy that is to constitute the standard for assessment of social pathologies. According to Honneth it is possible to assess if society is moving in the right direction by, assessing how far the society ensures more and more conditions of possibility for human self-realization, as he formulates as such:
“In this way ethical representation of social normality, which derives from the conditions of possibility of self-realization, represent the scale from which social pathologies are measured.”
(Honneth: 388)
“In sum, we can say that the determination of social pathologies in social philosophy always proceeds with a view to the social conditions that can promote the individual’s self-realization.”
(Honneth: 390)
This must be ensured by establishing a weak formalistic anthropology, that can function as the methodologic strategy for substantiation of the critique. In part this must be so abstract, that it cannot be accused of representing a specific interpretation of the good life, and in part it must be more specific than Kantian reference to the humans’ individual autonomy. It is a matter of a weak formalistic anthropology, as the theory does not formulate how the good life specifically should be lived, but only formulate the most basic preconditions for human self-realization. (Honneth: 394, Juul: 6)
Within critique as a moral philosophically substantiated critique, judgment is passed with explicit reference to normative standards, based on a deontological, teleological or ontological ethic (Compendium: 1). It is the task of the critique to pass judgement regarding for example unjust conditions based on a reference to normative standards for justice.
An example of normative standards that can be applied in a critique of society conditions, that can be judged on that basis, is a theory of justice formulated by Nancy Fraser. Frasers theory is a deontological theory of justice, that brings together a demand regarding socioeconomic redistribution with a demand regarding cultural recognition and political representation. In her theory of justice Fraser thus rejects that a theory cannot include standards for both recognition and redistribution, which she describes as a false antithesis (Fraser: 9 ff.).
In her argumentation Fraser for example points out groups, that can be subjected to both lack of recognition and lack of allocation of economic means, where no one of these conditions are directly derived from each other, why a one-dimensional theory of justice, that is only oriented towards either recognition or redistribution, is not able to include these groups’ situation. It can among other things be groups with specific gender, race or sexuality, but Fraser argues that there always will be both aspects of recognition and redistribution in regard to these groups, but that the weight will be placed differently according to the base of injustice towards a certain group. (Fraser: 25 ff.)
Fraser formulates a theory of justice where the normative core is a concept called “Parity of participation”. According to this norm justice presuppose social arrangements, that allow all members of society to interact with each other as equals. For Parity of participation to be possible there is at least two conditions that should be fulfilled, which Fraser calls Objective condition and Intersubjective condition. According to Objective condition the distribution of material resources should be arranged so that the members’ independence is ensured. According to Intersubjective condition the institutionalized circumstances regarding cultural values should express equal respect for all members, and ensure equal opportunities to achieve social recognition. (Fraser: 36)
As such Frasers theory of justice, formulated based on Parity of participation, includes both recognition and redistribution, without these being reduced to each other, and Fraser therefor calls the theory two-dimensional (Fraser: 37).
Parity of participation thus constitutes the base for assessment of injustice, whether it is regarding recognition or redistribution, as demands for social change in society are assessed with reference to whether they promote Parity of participation. In regard to redistribution, economic reforms are to be justified by, that they provide conditions, that can ensure full participation for some who are excluded from this, at the same time as they do not result in new or deteriorated inequalities on other areas, that cannot be justified.
In regard to recognition changes in the sociocultural institutions are justified by, that they favor circumstances that ensure the Intersubjective condition, while they do not result in creation or deterioration of unjust inequalities on other areas. As such Parity of participation constitute the base for assessment of injustice and demands for social and economic reforms in relation to the injustice. (Fraser: 39)
Critique as definition of social pathologies, as described based on Honneth, with reference to the normative as the extent of conditions of possibility for the humans’ self-realization, have as function to point out barriers to the good life and assign initiatives by which they can be overcome. With focus on an ethical question regarding conditions for the good life, as conditions of possibility of self-realization, Honneth has been criticized for not having view for the moral question regarding social justice. According to Fraser it can be derived from Honneths theory of recognition, that all demands for recognition should be accommodated, while it is not specified how specific demands for recognition should be assessed. According to Fraser demands for social reforms, regarding recognition and redistribution, should be possible to assess with reference to an existing moral injustice. In the discussion with Honneth, Fraser puts the ideal regarding justice higher than the ideal regarding self-realization, and makes the aspect of recognition to just one dimension in a two-dimensional theory of justice. (Juul: 11)
Honneth criticizes Frasers theory of justice for being without ethical basis and for taking an unclear position between ethical and deontological understandings of justice. According to Honneth, Fraser thus lacks an ethical argumentation for the ideal regarding Parity of participation, which at the same time is to substantial to be characterized as deontological principle.
Honneth moreover criticizes Frasers distinction between demands for recognition and redistribution, as he finds that they originate from the same rationale. According to Honneth both of these demands arise as a reaction to groups’ experience of violation, that result in a struggle for social rights and recognition.
In relation to assessment of specific demands for recognition, Honneth believes that it as a basis are demands that contribute positively to development of conditions of social recognition, that can be perceived as normatively substantiated. (Juul: 12)
But this basis that Honneth formulates for assessment of demands for recognition seem very abstract and insufficient, why his theory of recognition with focus on the good life lacks to consider how conditions for recognition can be distributed in a just manner.
In relation to the function and meaning of the critique it is thus a question of what the focus, basis or core is in the standards that constitute the basis for substantiation of a judgment. Should it be an ethical concern regarding the good life, that is pivotal, or should it be a moral concern regarding the right, and which relation is there between these matters.
Based on an analysis of the controversy between “context-forgetful” liberalists and “context-obsessed” communitarianists, Forst formulates a theory of justice, that include both the good and the right, as the theory links recognition of ethical identities, with recognition of individual rights, democratic procedure and universal moral principles. (Juul: 12)
Among other things through an analysis of the relation between ethic and law, Forst shows that ethical values and universal norms are expressions of different solutions to different questions, that are linked with different criteria for validity (Forst: 28).
Forst for one thing expresses it as such:
“To recognize a person as an equal bearer of rights is one thing; it is quite another to recognize this person who he or she is in all his or her attributes.”
(Forst: 27)
As such Forst differentiates between four normative contexts in which the human is included, that are linked but cannot be reduced to each other. It is the human as an ethical person, juridical person, citizen and moral person. I that regard a just society is a place where persons’ ethical identity is recognized and legally protected, by politically and autonomously proposed laws in a political community consisting of fully members, and where the law possesses a moral core that respects persons’ moral integrity (Forst: 230 ff.).
With regard to those situations where ethical, political and moral norms are in conflict with each other, the answer should be found in practical discourses between responsible citizens, and thereby Forst eventually puts his trust in the practical reason or judgment (Juul: 14).
Forsts theory thus include both the ethical question regarding the good life and the moral question regarding the right, while the theory integrates these with questions about individual juridical and political rights, at the same time as formulating criteria for validity in argumentation together with an intersubjective perspective on contexts of individual and society (Forst: 274).
In the light of Forsts theory it seems difficult to see how a normative theory of social science, as standard for substantiation of critique, can be assessed as sufficient, if it only concerns either the good or the right.
Literature
Forst, Reinar: “Context of Justice – Political philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism”, University of California Press
Foucault, Michael: “What Is Enlightment ?”, in Raibinow, P. (red.): “The Foucault Reader”, London: Penguin Press
Fraser, Nancy and Honneth, Axel: “Redistribution or Recognition? – A Political-Pholosophical Exchange”, translated by Golb, Joel; Ingram, James and Wilke, Christiane, London: Verso
Honneth, Axel: “Pathologies of the social: The past and present of social philosophy” in Rasmussen, David: “Handbook in Critical Theory”
Compendium for Project – and substitution seminar: The landscape of critique, Spring semester 2007, course responsible: Stormhøj, Christel
